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ABSTRACT 
THE UNITED NATIONS IN STATEBUILDING: A HISTORICAL 
INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE TO THE CASE OF KOSOVO 
 
Kaya, Sümeyye 
MA, Department of Political Science and International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Hüseyin Alptekin 
July 2016, 77 pages 
 
This thesis examines the role of United Nations (UN) in the peacebuilding 
process. This study argues the UN has success potential in peacebuilding, statebuilding 
in particular, rather than conflict prevention and peacemaking. The empirical base of 
the study is the Kosovo statebuilding process from 1999 to 2008. An in-depth analysis 
of institution building of Kosovo political institutions indicates the UN has the ability 
to create a new path for sustainable institutions that lead to sustainable peace in post-
war countries. The UN should cooperate with local actors in order to construct the new 
path and continuously support them until they become mature. Once cooperation of 
the UN and locals sets the path for new institutions, they will continue on their 
established path more with each down on that path. Kosovo institutions illustrate 
maturity and development in their success level based on Huntington’s criteria for 
successful institutions. 
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ÖZ 
DEVLET İNŞASINDA BIRLEŞMIŞ MILLETLER: KOSOVA’YA BIR 
TARIHSEL KURUMSALCI YAKLAŞIM 
 
Kaya, Sümeyye 
YL, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Danışman: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hüseyin Alptekin 
Temmuz 2016, 77 sayfa 
 
Bu çalışma, Birleşmiş Milletlerin barış inşası sürecindeki rolünü 
incelemektedir. Çalışma ile Birleşmiş Milletlerin çatışma önleme ve barış getirme 
aşamalarından ziyade barış inşası ve özellikle de devlet inşasında başarı potansiyeli 
taşıdığı ortaya koyulmuştur. Kosova savaşı sonrası 1999-2008 yılları arasında 
Birleşmiş Milletlerin Kosova’daki devlet inşası projesi derinlemesine incelenmiştir.  
Kosova devlet kurumlarının inşa süreci ele alınarak, Birleşmiş Milletlerin yerel 
aktörler ile işbirliği içerisinde kalarak yeni kurumları başarılı ve sürdürülebilir yeni bir 
yola koyabildiği gözlemlenmiştir. Bir kere yeni yol inşa edildikten sonra yola bağlılık 
varsayımından yararlanılarak başarılı bir devlet inşa etmenin mümkün olabileceği 
vurgulanmıştır. Kurumların başarı analizinde Huntington’ın kurumsal başarı 
ölçütlerinden yararlanılmıştır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Birleşmiş Milletler, Barış İnşaası, Devlet İnşaası, Kosova, Yola 
Bağlılık 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, there is an increase in the intra-state conflicts 
and duration of these conflicts around the world. Scholars and practitioners of conflict 
resolution field in line with this rise developed different theories on how to deal with 
the new face of war. On the contrary of Luttvak’s suggestion to “give war a chance” 
(1999), it became obvious that the post-Cold war conflicts did not burn down 
themselves (Mason, Weingarten & Fett, 1999; DeRouen & Sobek, 2004; Fearon, 
2004). The longer intrastate wars last, the less likely wars end with victory, therefore, 
there is a greater necessity for international organizations (IOs) to intervene in the 
conflicts to stop the cycle of violence. Otherwise, we end up with “steady 
accumulation of unresolved wars” (Fearon, 2004: 275). However, ending violent 
conflicts does not necessarily mean to achieve sustainable peace in the aftermath of 
wars.  
In this thesis, I will analyze the role of the United Nations (UN) in post-war 
peacebuilding process. The following question will shed light in the context of my 
research: What makes the UN more effective in peacebuilding to achieve sustainable 
peace? Using Kosovo as a case study, this thesis identifies the large-room potential for 
the UN involvement in the post-war reconstruction during and in the aftermath of state-
building through creating capable domestic political institutions that function 
peacefully and maintaining them until they can function independently in their own 
path dependent trajectories. It aims to promote an alternative approach to 
understanding peacebuilding efforts of the UN and in so doing to allow for the 
formulation of policy recommendations. This research analyzes the UN peacebuilding 
project in Kosovo from 1999 to 2008. This time period is chosen because although the 
UN is still legally present in Kosovo, it is not active as it was in pre-independence era. 
Therefore, it is an opportunity to investigate the UN’s peacebuilding project over nine 
years in Kosovo with an historical institutional perspective. Special emphasis is given 
to institution-building which is one of the subsets of statebuilding in this study. 
Historical institutionalism is an approach to the study of institutional change and 
continuity with a key concept of path dependency. Path dependency is an assumption 
to understand how institutions are resistant to change and when they are changed due 
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to a critical juncture. In order to use this concept in institution-building project of the 
UN, an assessment of the original development of domestic political institutions of 
Kosovo is necessary to explain the resistant nature of institutions for subsequent 
institutional development and change. In order to analyze institution-building with a 
historical institutionalist approach, a process tracing of institutional development is 
essential to observe the construction of a path and the impacts of that path over 
different actors affected by the institutions. Actions taken in the name of institution-
building, therefore, requires us to explain the evolution of political institutions of 
Kosovo - that is the assessment of institutional development. Therefore, this study 
takes the importance of historical institutional development, its origin and evolution 
over time, based on a path dependence assumption from the historical institutionalist 
perspective.  
Kosovo remains an important case study in international relations. The UN 
civilian administration in Kosovo has challenged existing norms such as state 
sovereignty and even quoted as “a new paradigm of international relations” (Weller, 
2009: 259). At the UN level Kosovo mission was “a new departure” in terms of its 
objectives and unprecedented scope of operational powers given to achieve those 
objectives (Matheson, 2001:76). Kosovo mission is considered as the most ambitious 
statebuilding project of the UN to date (Franks, 2009: 114). In comparison to the small 
size and population of Kosovo, the number of IOs involved, the amount of funds given, 
and the number of NATO troops deployed were impressive. Another recent UN 
involvement as a state-builder in post-war country is East Timor. Therefore, this study 
could be a comparative case study of Kosovo and East Timor, however, the East Timor 
case was rather easier than Kosovo because it was an ethnically more homogenous 
country without an internal conflict and the ultimate aim there was to prepare East 
Timor for independence. In Kosovo, in contrast, the future status was ambiguous in 
the resolution 1244 and the UN aimed to build a multi-ethnic state there without 
mentioning independence for Kosovo (Chesterman, 2005). 
1.1. Background of the Problem 
The failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s brought about the 
evolvement of the UN peacebuilding efforts from single ceasefire maintenance to 
multilateral, multidimensional and multinational peacebuilding missions. 
Nevertheless, the hands of the UN are still tied by its structural mechanism. It has a 
composite structure with 193 member states pursuing their own individual interests 
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and its decision making mechanism to issue a resolution in conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, and peacekeeping processes lays down in the Security Council. The UN 
remains slow to react in emergent cases due to veto power of its five permanent UNSC 
members under the article 27 of the UN Charter. It takes long for the UNSC to persuade 
its permanent members, especially Russia in the case of the Balkans, to act against 
aggressive behavior. NATO takes the responsibility to stop the violent conflicts and 
prepares the ground for the UN post-war peacebuilding missions since NATO is 
smaller and faster than the UN and has an effective coercive power. It seems unlikely 
to change the decision making mechanism of the UN in the foreseeable future, but the 
UN, despite a number of flaws, performs better in the long-run to create self-sustaining 
peace in post-war societies. What is left for the UN after NATO stops the wars is a 
valid question as discussed above that sustainable peace requires deep engagement 
with post-war countries apart from ending the wars since wars demolish economic, 
social, and political systems. The UN has more opportunities in the long-run in post-
war societies because almost all of the states in the world are its members, it is the only 
international forum where states discuss about the threat to international peace and 
security, and it has the necessary resources such as budget and personnel to engage 
with post-conflict peacebuilding. Moreover, thanks to its large number of members the 
UN has good ties to cooperate with NGOs, ROs, other IOs, and local conflicting 
parties. The members of regional organizations are also members of the UN that makes 
easy to work with them. Although the UN was neither able to prevent the war in 
Kosovo nor to stop it in 1999, it achieved to prevent a recurrence of war in Kosovo 
since the establishment of its open-ended civilian mission in 1999 and Kosovo 
declared independence in 2008 and recognized as a sovereign state by 108 UN 
members today.  After NATO started its air campaign over then Yugoslav forces for 
78 days on March 1999, the war was stopped. Then, the UNSC Resolution 1244 
mandated the establishment of United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) with the task of establishing a democratic and autonomous self-government, 
“pending a final settlement”, in Kosovo (S/RES/1244, 1999: 3). This mandate gave 
the UN a long-term to succeed in its sustainable peace objective. How the UN has 
proceed in this mission of establishing a self-government is the core research area of 
this thesis.  
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1.2. Methods and Data 
This study is both descriptive and normative in the sense that I first analyze 
how the UN has been performing statebuilding in the Kosovo case and then I work on 
how the UN can/could do better in Kosovo. My study is a qualitative case analysis. I 
will use the process tracing method to analyze the linkages between the series of steps 
taken by the UN and the causes and outcomes of these steps. Process tracing method 
helps us to analyze trajectories of change and causation within-case studies (George 
and Bennett, 2005). The first step of gathering information is based on the secondary 
literature, archival analysis of existing documents of international institutions such as 
the UN, OSCE, ICG, and NGOs locally working in Kosovo, and semi-structured elite 
interviews. I made interviews with officials from the UN, OSCE, and some local 
NGOs in Kosovo in August, 2015.  I will analyze the data using content analysis of 
the acquired archives and interview transcripts in order to locate the actors’ interests, 
identities, and strategies to evaluate the institution-building project and its effects on 
peace in Kosovo.  
I take the speed of the UN’s reaction to the case (slow reaction with enduring 
length and long-term goals vs rapid reaction with short term goals), which is itself 
caused by the UN’s decision making structure, as my independent variable. My 
dependent variable is the degree of effectiveness in the post-war peacebuilding process 
of Kosovo. As the UN is not able to take decisions in a short span of time, which is a 
crucial requirement for peacemaking (war stopping) missions, it can do better after the 
war is stopped, particularly in the realm of peacebuilding, thanks to its organizational 
structure suitable for long-term missions.  
I believe the post-war state-building process of the UN has not successfully 
met historical institutionalist insights in the conflict resolution field. I will apply “path 
dependency” assumption of historical institutionalism to the case of Kosovo. Ruane 
and Todd (2007) uses path dependency assumption of historical institutionalist school 
only to explain how conflicting parties came to a settlement in Northern Ireland. They 
explain how it was possible to settle this conflict through historical process training. 
Since my study is about post-settlement process, it will enrich the analytical 
perspective of this field.  
1.3. Theory in a Nutshell  
According to historical institutionalists, institutional change is difficult and 
state institutions remain stable. Radical changes in institutions occur during the critical 
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junctures as a result of exogenous shocks such as economic crises and wars. Such 
critical junctures are not easily identifiable in advance but they demolish the old state 
systems and create a situation in indeterminate flux in those states (Thelen, 1999). In 
such a situation, the new system has many possible directions to go. In Kosovo after 
the 1999 war, there occurred a flux situation where the UN could give the direction for 
a new path. I ask the questions of how the UN gave the direction for a new path in 
Kosovo with an in-depth examination of the history of the political institution-building 
in Kosovo from 1999 to 2008 and whether its attempt was sufficient to institutionalize 
the political institutions of Kosovo to create a sustainable peace. 
This study supports the UN administrative role at the beginning of institution-
building processes. As Paris (2004) outlines in his book that since post-war societies 
lack necessary means to create functioning state institutions, the UN can take the 
administrative role at the beginning and it can gradually transfer its power to local 
actors. “It is not a democratic option, but it can end conflict immediately and it can 
perhaps restore stability and eliminate the threat of a new breakdown in the long run” 
(Ottoway, 2002: 1021). Institution-building, however, does not finish when state 
organizations are established. The UN needs to enforce the rulers to keep their 
commitments until political institutions reach to a state of maturity and then a new path 
will be created that will bring self-sustaining peace due to path dependency that 
institutions are foreshadowed by original design, therefore, initial steps in institution 
creation are influential for the future of these institutions (Collier & Collier, 1991). 
But why do institutions promote and sustain peace? And why are they path dependent?  
Institutions shape human interaction and form their behavior in a society 
(North, 1990). Uncertainty arising from collective choice situations in everyday life 
can be overcome by institutions. Formal political institutions have legal constraints 
that once these institutions are constructed both those who support and oppose their 
creation will be bound by them. Since political institutions have coercive power 
through laws such as punishment to those who disobey, they become “guide to human 
interaction” in terms of what has to be done and cannot be done (Rose, 1990).  
 According to the historical institutionalist school, once state institutions are 
constructed it is hard to change their path due to reasons such as increasing returns 
(Pierson, 2000, 2004), high learning cost, normative power of institutions, and 
institutional complementarities (North, 1990; Hall, 1989; Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Thelen, 2003; Mahoney, 2000; Steinmo, 2008). It is easier to proceed along the same 
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path because once people learn about the system, a radical change becomes costly in 
terms of time and budget. Norms, habits and repertoire in the society are also shaped 
around the existing path. And if a change will be made in one part of the system, it 
needs to be complementary to the existing ones. After the UN plants the seeds of state 
institutions together with the local actors and enforces the rulers until they reach to a 
stage of maturity, peace in the country becomes less costly, more genuine, and long-
lasting. Therefore, sustainable peace depends on the success of state institutions.  
The identification of institution-building with success or failure is possible 
through Huntington’s two criteria for successful institutions: “the scope of support and 
the level of institutionalization” (1973:12). He also gives four criteria for 
institutionalization, namely: adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of 
established institutions (1973: 12-24). If the success or failure in institutions affects 
the degree of peace as this study argues, how is it possible to estimate peace in a post-
conflict country? In order to assess the degree of peace, Galtung’s triangle model for 
conflict as well for peace will be used (1996: 72). According to Galtung, the main 
reason of conflict is contradiction or incompatibility which is located at the top of the 
conflict triangle. Contradiction occurs due to the incompatibility of goals between 
conflicting parties. Violent attitude and behavior are at the base of the triangle. 
Whereas attitude refers to the conflicting parties’ perceptions of each other and 
themselves, behavior includes visible elements such as hostile threats and attacks. 
Galtung argues all three elements have to exist for a full conflict (Galtung, 1996: 72-
73). Based on its identification of conflict elements, he proposed a triangle of violence, 
namely structural violence, cultural violence, and direct violence which are related to 
the triangle of elements; contradiction, attitude, and behavior respectively. He then 
argues in order to achieve sustainable peace, all three types of violence must be 
addressed. His criteria for sustainable peace helps us to identify the degree of peace in 
Kosovo (Galtung, 1996). 
Conflict resolution literature uses international relations and social 
psychological theories to analyze the causes and possible solutions of internal war, 
however, “historical institutionalist” school of comparative politics is not used 
sufficiently in the literature to offer an alternative way of analyzing post-conflict 
peacebuilding processes and to obtain sustainable peace. 
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1.4. Plan of the thesis 
In Chapter Two I explain my theoretical framework and offer an alternative 
analysis perspective for the UN statebuilding project. Covering existing debate on 
statebuilding, I support the UN’s quasi-top-down institutional design, which should be 
suitable to local conditions and acceptable by the local actors though, at the very 
beginning of statebuilding. This chapter reads the statebuilding process from a 
historical institutionalist perspective and explains the UN success or failure in building 
political institutions. Why institutionalization should be prioritized by the UN in 
statebuilding process and how my research analyzes institutionalization of formal state 
institutions will be explained. I define mostly used terms such as conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, peacebuilding, statebuilding. The assessment of peace will also be 
examined in this chapter based on Galtung’s conflict triangle.  
Chapter Three is the application of my theory to the case of Kosovo. After 
giving a brief historical background of the conflict in Kosovo and the process leading 
to the UN involvement in 1999, I analyze the political institution building of Kosovo 
by the UN in its initial presence in 1999-2001. How the UN has attempted to build 
political institutions is analyzed in chapter three and whether its attempts were failure 
or success will be analyzed in Chapter Four. Alongside with Huntington’s criteria for 
successful institutions, I make an in-depth analysis of Kosovo institutions from 1999-
2008. The degree of peace in Kosovo will also be examined in Chapter Four. In the 
conclusion chapter, the contribution of this study is summarized as well as its 
limitations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE PREREQUISITES OF SUCCESSFUL UN PEACEBUILDING: A 
THEORETICAL APPLICATION OF HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
ON PEACEBUILDING RESEARCH 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Why does the UN often fail in intervening in crises that require immediate 
action despite its abundant resources, large number of personnel with great expertise, 
and greater legitimacy than other international organizations? Yet why do most of us 
still hope the UN to bring about peace? The UN is often too late to prevent the outbreak 
of conflict but is still needed anywhere we see conflict? What is the magic trick of the 
UN to keep our hopes high? Why is it this slow and ineffective to take immediate 
action for emerging conflicts but at the same time the most important international 
actor for peacebuilding? This chapter develops a theoretical framework to answer 
these questions and analyze the UN role in conflict resolution and its role in the 
peacebuilding phase in particular. I argue that the UN is most effective on the 
peacebuilding stage of conflict resolution rather than the conflict prevention, 
peacekeeping, and peacemaking phases primarily due to its decision making and 
policy implementation mechanisms. The UN is a composite structure. It needs 
anonymous decision-making of actors with too diverse interests and aspirations. This 
takes time and the UN cannot be as effective as, for instance, NATO which can act 
faster due to its freedom from the UN’s mentioned deficiencies. The UN is better at 
peacebuilding a process that does not require momentary action and momentary 
results. Rather, peacebuilding is spread over time. Peacebuilding requires legitimacy 
and long-term commitment, both of which the UN satisfies. 
I analyze the arguments of realist, Marxist, liberal institutionalist, and critical 
theorists on the UN role in conflict resolution in my literature review section to show 
that path dependency is not sufficiently incorporated to the literature. I then 
conceptualize the key terms used in this study: conflict prevention, peacemaking, and 
peacebuilding. In conflict resolution literature, these terms are used with ambiguous 
conceptual boundaries and in order to avoid it I use Lund’s (2002) curve to show my 
argument better. Finally, I create my theoretical framework. In a nutshell, I argue the 
UN can successfully work in post-conflict societies by setting the path of political 
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institutions in cooperation with the locals in the first place, and then enforcing these 
institutions until becoming mature enough to function on their own without the UN’s 
interference, and in the meanwhile transferring authority to the locals.  
2.2. Literature Review 
International relations theories differ in their perception of IOs in conflict 
resolution field. The UN in particular is their main target as the aim of its foundation 
was to protect international peace and security. While neo-realists like Bobbitt, Gray, 
and Waltz and Marxists like Harvey do not give any credit to the UN in terms of 
efficiency, liberal institutionalists, as Keohane and Nye, write a success story for it in 
the conflict resolution field. The debate on the legitimacy of international interventions 
by the UN in sovereign states continues to surge for an appropriate conflict resolution 
system and at the same time, contemporary liberal peacebuilding is not left without 
critics.   
While not using the conflict resolution language at all, realists see the 
involvement of the UN in conflicts as ineffective and inappropriate. For realists, 
conflict is inevitable in the post-Cold War world due to the existence of an anarchic 
system and therefore the UN must only wait for the wars burning themselves out 
(Luttwak, 1999:36). In the aftermath of Cold War, the Balkan wars broke out in spite 
of the presence of the UN, therefore, the UN is not capable of preventing violence in 
such an anarchic system (Mearsheimer, 1990, 1995; Bobbitt, 2002; Gray, 2002; Waltz, 
2002; Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, 1996). Bobbitt describes the UN as one of the 
“discredited multinational institutions of the nation-state” (Bobbitt, 2002: 821). IOs, 
in general, are involved in conflicts only when the interests of great powers are in 
danger. The great powers benefit from the existing system and they may use IOs to 
make adjustments within the existing system. Neo-realists suggest “stabilization 
forces”, which refers to “military support for stability, security, transition and 
reconstruction operations” in cases where failing states become potential home for 
terrorism or the regimes threating international peace and security have been 
overthrown (US Department of Defense, 2005). Therefore, the room for peacemaking 
should be left to the cooperation of willing and capable states not to the UN. However, 
since the end of the Cold War a “quick military fix” was beneficial only to open the 
space for the soft power of the UN. Military operations over Iraq and Afghanistan 
proved the limits of military operations and necessity for post-military reconstruction 
(Woodhouse, 1999). I agree the UN is not effective in peacemaking but not because 
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the system is anarchic but because the structure of the UN does not allow it to take 
rapid action. While I support the realist claim of states’ reactions to conflict situations 
based on their interests, I do not call the UN ineffective in peacebuilding as I will 
explain in my theory section in detail.  
Apart from the ineffectiveness in peacemaking for the realist school, Marxists 
do not give any room to the UN in post-conflict cases as well. For Marxists post-
conflict peacebuilding efforts are just one of the examples of new imperialism and 
pointless attempts to save an unequal system, when an attempt to change it is needed 
(Harvey, 2005). Harvey focuses on the US intervention in the Middle East, especially 
in Iraq. With or without the UN’s approval, the US tries to maintain its global role in 
economics and politics realms through controlling the Middle East. The US’s 
peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts are “all about oil” in the Middle East (Harvey, 
2005: 1-26). 
From the perspective of institutionalist liberal theory, the UN plays a critical 
role in conflict resolution, especially in the post-conflict peacebuilding phase. The UN 
carries the liberal package with it consisting of democracy, human rights, the rule of 
law, and free-market economy, and the UN applies this package to conflicts with the 
help of other IOs and NGOs. Keohane and Nye (1989) argue liberal democracy started 
a new era in the international system and this liberal package is tested over time and 
proved its success in benefiting states, citizens, and unprivileged people in the world 
(Alvarez, 2005). The UN as the biggest forum of states can increase the likelihood of 
cooperation among states even in this anarchic system. Cooperation under an 
international organization umbrella reduces the transaction costs by institutionalizing 
cooperation and future agreements (Oye 1986; Stein 1983). If IOs work in line with 
the common interests of states, they can be successful even in security issues. IOs play 
the role of third party in conflicts with their conflict resolution tools that could be used 
to prevent conflict or after conflict already occurs (Keohane 1984; Yarbrough & 
Yarbrough 1992; Garrett & Weingast 1993). IOs, “international regimes” as Keohane 
calls them, reduce the uncertainty of reaching agreements for states to persuade their 
self-interested purposes through information-providing mechanisms (1984: 246-247).  
For Nye, the UN becomes ineffective in peacebuilding process due to a key problem 
which is the lack of clarity in UN mandates. He argues the huge differences in the 
scope of peace enforcements, for example in Bosnia and Congo where limited force 
was allowed in the former and more robust military force was ready in the later one, 
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make peacebuilding process ambiguous to the UN staff operating inside (2008). Two 
other problems in the UN peacebuilding measures in creating peaceful societies in the 
aftermath of civil wars are resources and commitment of participant states for enough 
span of time in post-war societies. I support that resources and commitment are 
essential in successful peacebuilding missions, since it takes long-time for the UN to 
construct war-torn societies. 
Liberal institutionalists are criticized most by the critical theorists. From 
critical theoretical approach existing conflict resolution tactics of the UN recreate 
power imbalances, inequalities, domination, and exclusion in conflicting zones. 
Powerful states, since the IOs as they are controlled by a state-centric system, judge 
the non-Western societies with liberal norms, thus they identify them as the “other”. 
The powerful member states of the UN perceive the outbreak of post-cold war internal 
wars as the local failures of non-liberal countries but they are actually the result of 
adaptation process of the “other” with the global economy from critical perspective. 
The UN in post-conflict societies try to change the social, political, and economic 
structures so that they become in line with liberal norms, however, the change must 
occur in the global economic and political structures of the existing world system 
(Duffield, 2001; 2007). Contemporary conflict resolution mechanisms of the UN are 
identified with liberal peacebuilding in critical approach. As MacGinty puts it: 
“Liberalism had become a kind of magic dust that, if spread within states and 
economies, would produce harmony and prosperity at the international level” (2015: 
318). The liberal peacebuilding efforts of IOs are criticized as benefitting only the 
power-holders not the public in general. Liberal peacebuilding contradicts in itself for 
the critical theorists. The UN with the cooperation of other IOs such as IMF, WB, and 
OSCE uses illiberal and undemocratic means in their pursuit of liberal peacebuilding. 
Liberal norms of the West are imposed to non-Western societies from top to down 
without necessary local ownership of the process (Narten, 2008; Fortna, 2004). 
Peacebuilding processes are not transparent and answerable to the intervened. IOs 
produce dependent countries to the richest ones and they pave the way for domination 
and exclusion of the local people in the “other” (MacGinty, 2015; Jabri, 2007; 
Hoffman, 2009; Richmond, 2008; Paris, 2004; Pugh, Cooper & Turner, 2008). The 
top-down nature of UN peacebuilding efforts combined with fixed-Western-liberal 
package is the core factor of UN’s inability in creating sustainable peace for the critical 
theorists. Although scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution benefited a great 
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deal from the critics of critical theory, critical theorists lack the suggestions for 
practical future alternatives (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2012). As Paris 
outlines (2010) “nothing in the recent critical literature provides a convincing rationale 
for abandoning liberal peacebuilding or replacing it with a non-liberal or ‘post-liberal’ 
alternative” (2010: 4). I support his assumption of “institutionalization-before-
liberalization” in peacebuilding efforts of the UN. According to this assumption, the 
UN can be better in post-conflict societies if it prioritizes institutionalization of state 
institutions in the first place and then it gradually transfers full administrative power 
to the locals (2004).  
I agree with the liberal call for IOs engagement with conflicts, but I do not see 
the UN successful in pre-war stages of conflicts based on my analysis in Kosovo. I do 
not mean to say here that the pre-war stages should be left for NATO’s military power 
as realists suggest, rather, I aim to develop an analytical framework for post-conflict 
reconstruction where the UN is already actively involved for sustainable peace via 
adopting historical institutionalist assumption of path dependency in the process of 
statebuilding. Rather than defining the UN as failing in statebuilding mission, this 
study takes an optimistic way of analysis and defines the UN successful in 
statebuilding.  
2.3. Conceptualizing Conflict Prevention, Peacemaking, and 
Peacebuilding  
In my conceptualization of conflict prevention, peacemaking, and 
peacebuilding I use Lund’s curve of conflict in the Figure 1, below, and take insights 
from his definition of these terms. In order to escape from overlapping of these three 
terms, conflict prevention excludes measures taken after the war ends to prevent the 
renewal of it. War stopping refers to peacemaking and peace efforts after the cessation 
of violence refer to peacebuilding. 
2.3.1. Conflict Prevention 
Conflict prevention means to prevent conflict from emerging and once a latent 
conflict emerges, to prevent the conflict to reach to the stage of violence. As Boutros-
Ghali, former Secretary General of the UN from 1992 to 1996, pointed out in 1992, 
conflict prevention does not only mean that the UN only contains regional conflicts 
not to escalate and spread to other regions as proposed by UN former Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjöld (1953-1961). But it would also prevent the start of conflict 
in the first place (UN, 1992). In this study conflict prevention refers to “any structural 
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or intercessory means to keep intrastate or interstate tensions and disputes from 
escalating into significant violence and use of armed forces, to strengthen the 
capabilities of potential parties to violent conflict for resolving such disputes 
peacefully and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that produce these 
issues and disputes” (Lund, 2002b: 117, n. 6). The UN Charter in Chapter VI and 
Chapter VII authorize the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretary-
General to settle disputes to prevent them to escalate to war through different 
mechanisms such as “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means”. If 
peaceful means are not effective in dispute resolution, the UNSC can take military 
enforcement actions. During the Cold War era, the UNSC was not effective in terms 
of taking necessary decisions in conflict areas to prevent or stop the conflicts. The veto 
power of five permanent members, the UK, the US, the Soviet Union, China, and 
France, in issuing internationally binding resolutions blocked the decision making 
process of the UN in such a bipolar international system where great powers responded 
conflicts according to their own political interests (Bobbitt, 2002; Gray, 2002; Waltz, 
2002; Shweller & Preiss, 1997; Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, 1996). Conflict prevention 
mechanism of the UN is still not very efficient because there is no particular agency 
in the Secretariat to institutionalize the process of conflict prevention and it is 
perceived as great power interference by the developing states. Its legality and viability 
are also problematic for member states (Ackermann, 2003: 344).   
2.3.2 Peacemaking 
A war is defined as an organized military action which causes 1,000 battle 
related deaths in a given year by the Armed Conflict Date Set (ACD). And a civil 
war occurs within an internationally recognized state’s boundaries among the state 
and one or more armed opposition groups and “the rebels must recruit mostly locally, 
controlling some part of the country’s territory” (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006: 31). A 
war ends with military victory, peace agreements, and ceasefires with or without 
peace agreements (Collier, 2011), if twenty-five battle-related deaths does not occur 
in the following year (ACD). Peacemaking refers to the termination of war once it 
occurs. In the post-Cold War era, although war ending with peace agreements 
increased in number, the number of wars ending with the cessation of violence 
without a peace agreement is larger than other categories of war endings 
(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2012: 172). Doyle and Sambanis classify the 
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war termination based on the way of its termination. If the war ends with a peace 
treaty or a military victory, then if an armed conflict does not reoccur within six 
months, the war ends. If it ends with a ceasefire or truce without a peace agreement, 
as the intention of conflicting parties are not clear in a peace agreement, no armed 
conflict within two years is necessary to call the war termination (2006: 135). I do 
not include post-war peace efforts in my definition of peacemaking. What I mean by 
the UN’s ineffectiveness in peacemaking is its inability to stop intra-state armed 
conflicts in a short time period where civilians suffer the most and fast reaction is 
crucial.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Lund’s Curve of Conflict Source: United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 
 
2.3.3. Peacebuilding 
Peacebuilding in this study refers to peace establishment efforts taken after an 
armed conflict is terminated. In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali defined 
post-conflict peacebuilding as an attempt to prevent a recurrence of violence after the 
war ends. Therefore, peacebuilding is a post-conflict reconstruction attempts that may 
include social, political, and military objectives to prevent a recurrence of violence and 
obtain sustainable peace. A subset of peacebuilding, statebuilding, in this study is 
defined as construction or reconstruction of state institutions in the process of 
                                                          
1 According to Article 33 of the UN Charter peacemaking measures include: “negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies 
or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice”. If peaceful means do not 
cease violence, the UN can take military measures. 
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peacebuilding. “Statebuilding is a specific approach to peacebuilding that sees 
improvements in government capacities to deliver on security and development aims 
as long-term linchpin to consolidating peace and solidifying the institutions and 
processes of governance to create the conditions for societies to sustainably develop 
and prosper on their own” (Sisk, 2013: 5-6).  
2.4. A theory on the effectiveness of United Nations in peacebuilding 
United Nations peace operations have evolved since the foundation of the UN 
throughout the Cold-War era and its aftermath. This evolution period has shaped its 
peacebuilding strategy, therefore, in order to examine the UN in peacebuilding the 
development of this concept is important to mention. In comparing three generations 
of UN peace efforts, the term “peacekeeping” is used to define general UN peace 
operations.   
2.4.1. Evolution of UN peace operations: the path towards peacebuilding 
The reason of the UN’s formation at the end of the WWII was to protect 
international peace and security in order not to experience such a devastating war again 
in the world as stated in Article 1 of the UN Charter. The United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) was responsible in settling disputes of member states, if they fail to 
do so through peaceful mechanisms, the decision to take military enforcement actions 
laid down in the UNSC as well. During the Cold-war era, the UNSC was not effective 
in terms of taking necessary decisions in conflict areas to prevent or stop the conflicts. 
This was the case because UNSC decision making process was blocked either by the 
US or the Soviet Union at that time. Great powers reacted to inter-state conflicts 
according to their own political interests (Bobbitt, 2002; Gray, 2002; Waltz, 2002). 
Therefore, the UN peacekeeping operations only involved maintaining ceasefires 
through unarmed military observations, process monitoring, and reporting. This is 
called “first-generation peacekeeping operations” of the UN2 (Richmond, 2009: 16; 
Doyle & Sambanis, 2006: 11; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2012: 148).  
Goulding, Under-Secretary General of the UN from 1986 to 1997, defined the first 
generation peacekeeping as:  
Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the 
parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under 
                                                          
2 There are some exceptions in these three generations of the UN peace operations. 
For example, before the end of the Cold-War the UN undertook “third generation” 
operation in Congo in 1960 to 1964. This classification is based on the general trend 
in the UN doctrine on peace operations (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006: 10-18). 
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United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the 
member states, and military and other personnel and equipment provided 
voluntarily by them, acting impartially between parties and using force to the 
minimum extent necessary (1993: 455, [emphasis added]).  
First generation peacekeeping therefore required the consent of the parties, 
impartiality, and minimum use of force as also shown in the table 1 below. The first 
case where the UNSC authorized to use force until the case of Somalia in 1992 was in 
Congo in 1960 to end the secession of Katanga (Goulding, 1993: 452). Hence, it is fair 
to define the first generation peacekeeping as “unarmed” operations in order to 
distinguish it from the second generation.  
First generation peacekeeping was mostly deployed to inter-state wars as in the 
post-World War II majority of the wars were among states not within them. The UN 
tried to help conflicting states to stop fighting and coming to an agreement and if an 
agreement was reached, it monitored the truce by establishing buffer zones such as in 
Egypt (1956), Yemen (1963), Cyprus (1974), Lebanon (1978), and Namibia (1989) 
(Goulding, 1993; Paris, 2004; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2012). The UN 
forces had to be impartial, not taking side, and small number of countries contributed 
to these missions. 
The UN assisted conflicting states successfully to reach agreements, especially 
in the Near East, but it could not resolve the underlying problems due to the Cold-War 
world order (Goulding, 1993: Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). Right after the period of 
Cold-War, there occurred a necessity to move beyond the traditional peacekeeping due 
to the rise of intra-state wars in which more than ceasefire maintenance expected. 
These wars targeted civilians, social and political institutions of states, therefore, the 
UN had to tackle with underlying reasons of the civil wars. The UN started to deploy 
different sources with more than half of member states’ contributions such as 
humanitarian, security, and political with the consent of parties concerned. This was 
“second generation peacekeeping operations”. However, the requirement of having the 
consent of conflicting parties did not work in intra-state conflicts since there were 
many actors benefitting from the ongoing wars such as warlords and international drug 
cartels trading resources of state in conflict and there stayed the possibility of 
withdrawal of consent once given, which was the case in Egypt in 1967 3 (Keen, 2008). 
                                                          
3 President Nasser refused to permit the nine-year-present UNEF I to continue in May 1967, 
available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html#three 
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In the mid-1990s despite the UN peacekeeping presence, in Rwanda and Bosnia 
genocide took place and hundreds of Somali people were killed. This showed the 
inadequacy of UN peacekeeping forces with the mandate of staying neutral, impartial, 
and using force only in self-defense (Rieff, 1994). 
Table 2.1. Generations of UN Peace Operations 
 
 
There were different alternatives among the scholars of political scientists to 
the second generation peacekeeping. Some scholars suggested the UN have to take 
side in civil wars (Betts, 1994; Rieff, 1994; Weiss, 1994) or wait for the wars burning 
themselves out (Luttwak, 1999). Contrary to Luttvak’s suggestion to “give war a 
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chance” (1999), it became obvious that the post-Cold war conflicts did not burn down 
themselves (Mason, Weingarten & Fett, 1999; DeRouen & Sobek, 2004; Fearon, 
2004). The longer intrastate wars last, the less likely wars end with victory; therefore, 
there is a greater necessity for the UN to intervene in the conflicts to stop the cycle of 
violence. Otherwise, we end up with “steady accumulation of unresolved wars” 
(Fearon, 2004: 275). 
Expectations for the UN’s quick involvement in intra-state conflicts raised also 
due to the fact that since 1990s internal wars have been conceived as major threat to 
international peace and security due a number of factors. They easily spread to 
neighboring countries and cause regional conflicts such as in the case of Zaire in 1996.4 
Even if they are contained within their borders, the number of civilians killed in these 
wars outnumbers the death toll of soldiers, which results in the flow of refugees 
threatening the political stability of host countries (Chesterman, 2001; Lake & 
Rothchild, 1998; Brown, 1996). The vacuum of failed states is filled by terrorists, drug 
traffickers, and human traffickers who are engaged in transnational crimes during and 
after the civil conflicts.  
This new type of war requires peacemaking or war ending as quick as possible 
because of the number of civilian death, the power vacuums left by “state failure” 
(Ayoob, 1995: 22) and splashing of conflict across state boundaries and neighboring 
countries (Vazquez, 1992; Late & Rothchild, 1998). On the other hand, the UN 
remains slow to react in emergent cases due to veto power of its five permanent UNSC 
members under the Article 27 of the UN Charter paragraph 3:  
Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters (non-procedural matters) 
shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring 
votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, 
and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from 
voting [emphasis added].  
The statement of “the concurring votes of the permanent members” means a 
decision can be taken only unanimously meaning that a veto from one member is 
enough to prevent the UN to authorize the use of military force. The lack of unanimity 
among the five permanent members on the issue of intervening intra-state conflicts 
slow down the process of taking necessary actions. China and Russia support the 
principle of state sovereignty, therefore, the duration of civil war lengthens causing 
                                                          
4 The conflict in Rwanda spread to Zaire and caused a regional conflict that lasted for a 
decade.  
19 
 
local, regional, and international problems (Roger, 2004). It takes long for the UNSC 
to persuade its permanent members, especially Russia in the case of the Balkans, to 
act against aggressive behavior via coercive power. Hence, the argument of “the veto 
paralyzes the work of the Council” is still valid today (Väyrynen, 1985: 193). Who 
stops the majority of civil wars and in what way?  
The UN has become an organization “confined to mandating UN humanitarian, 
peacekeeping, and transitional government mop-up operations after US led military 
interventions” (Malone, 2004a: 2). This is because NATO internalized the new 
doctrine of “third generation” peace enforcement operations required in intra-state 
wars of post-Cold War era.5 NATO has stopped wars in the post-Cold War with or 
without the UN authorization in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, East Timor, and 
Kosovo and paved way for the UN peacebuilding missions. NATO is smaller and 
faster than the UN and has an effective coercive power in peacemaking, however, 
military enforcement does not bring sustainable peace and after the cessation of 
violence “taking the next step” lays down on the UN (Annan, 1997: 27-28). Peace 
settlements without long-term peacebuilding missions often break down (Licklider, 
1995; Toft, 2010). Cambodia experienced such a renewed violence in late 1996, Sierra 
Leone in 2000, and Guatemala had sixteen peace agreements and most of them failed.6 
Military operations such as in Afghanistan and Iraq also proved the limits of military 
operations and necessity for post-military reconstruction to prevent a recurrence of 
violence and establish sustainable peace (Call & Cousens, 2008).   
In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali defined post-conflict 
peacebuilding as an attempt to prevent a recurrence of violence after the war ends. To 
do so, he proposed “rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by 
civil war and strife”. Since then the UN focuses on the construction or strengthening 
of legitimate governmental institutions or “the creation of structures for the 
institutionalization of peace” in countries emerging from civil conflict, or what it is 
called post-war statebuilding in the literature (Sisk, 2013; Paris & Sisk, 2009; Jarstad 
& Sisk, 2008). The mainstream UN logic in emphasizing the government institutions 
in creating sustainable peace is derived from the cause of civil war which is “usually 
                                                          
5 “The new doctrine (third generation)” aimed to create a peacekeeping force “sufficiently 
flexible, robust, and combat ready” and NATO internalized this doctrine (Hansen, 
Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 2013: 7) 
6 Available at United Nations Peacemaker website: http://peacemaker.un.org/ 
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about failures of legitimate state authority”, therefore, “sustainable peace relies on its 
successful reconstruction” (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006: 28). 
In earlier responses the UN used “myopic” peacebuilding approaches in post-
conflict societies (Sisk, 2013). They were about having quick elections right after a 
peace deal was signed and creating a market-oriented economic structures and then 
exit as soon as possible before governmental institutions were constructed (Caplan, 
2012). Due to the renewals of violence in post-conflict period, statebuilding has 
become a linchpin priority in the formation of long-lasting peace. Paris, being critical 
on the issue of quick statebuilding strategies, argued an alternative of 
“institutionalization before liberalization”. According to his alternative strategy, 
statebuilding efforts generate sustainable peace if state institutions are successfully 
functioning. And this can be accomplished through: a) international statebuilders are 
supplied enough political and economic resources, b) the post-conflict government is 
staffed with international personnel in the first place, c) locals are trained to be able to 
take the responsibility in government institutions, d) security and justice are paid 
particular attention rather than economic liberalization, e) administrative power is 
transferred to locals gradually, and d) internationals remain as long as it takes to 
accomplish well-functioning central governmental institutions before they exit (Paris, 
2004: 189-207).  
2.4.2. Why institutions are important for sustainable peace? A Historical 
institutionalist perspective on the UN statebuilding 
Once a country or region has started down on a track, the costs of reversal are 
very high. Margaret Levi, 1997:28 
Historical institutionalists embrace the assumption of “institutions matter” that 
has its roots in early discussions of political theorists like Plato and Aristotle. Both 
philosophers aimed to understand how institutions shape political behavior. Historical 
institutionalists advanced this assumption and created theories on how institutions 
matter, why they remain resistant on their path and how a change is possible. The basic 
logic behind most of the historical institutionalist theories is that policy choices taken 
in the formation of an institution will have lasting influence over the subsequent 
policies in the future (Huber & Stephens 2001, Pierson, 2000; Hacker 1998; Ertman 
1996; Collier & Collier 1991; Shefter 1977). This argument is explained through their 
key concept, path dependency, which is given special attention within the context of 
this research.  
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Path dependence is a process where “outcomes at a ‘critical juncture’ trigger 
feedback mechanisms that reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern into the 
future” (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002: 6). Pierson takes the process of increasing returns 
from economics and implies it to his explanation of path dependency in political 
institutions. In economics, W. Brian Arthur’s (1989) example of QWERTY keyboard 
in typewriter defined what increasing returns meant in path dependent nature of some 
products. Arthur argued despite the fact that QWERTY keyboard was inefficient in 
the time of typewriting, in today’s digital age we still use QWERTY keyboard. 
Although there are other more efficient keyboard setups, the reasons behind our 
resistance in using QWERTY keyboard are related to the effect of large start-up cost, 
learning effects, coordination effects and the effect of adaptive expectations. Not all 
products generate increasing returns as soon as they have these four effects. Start-up 
cost refers to the cost spent in the formation of a product and in order to avoid a new 
start-up cost people stick to what they have previously paid for. Constancy in using 
the product professions people and they develop innovative ideas on the product, that 
is the learning effect. Coordination effect means the more people use the product the 
more attractive it becomes and more compatible products are produced as well. 
Adaptive expectations mean that people will adopt their actions based on their 
expectations, therefore, the more a product is sold, and the more people will prefer it.  
 Pierson argues political institutions have intense tendency towards path 
dependent processes. Path dependence refers to the increase “in the probability of 
further steps along the same path with each move down that path”. For him, the process 
of increasing returns refers to the increase of “the relative benefits of the current 
activity compared with other possible options” over time and steadily falling of the 
cost per unit with each move (2000: 252). The relative benefits and the fall of cost on 
the same path rise the cost of exit at the same time. This is due to a number of factors. 
Formal political institutions have legal constraints that once these institutions are 
constructed both those who support and oppose their creation will be bound by them. 
Since political institutions have coercive power through laws such as punishment to 
those who disobey, they become “guide to human interaction” in terms of what has to 
be done and cannot be done (Rose, 1990). Creation of institutions has start-up costs 
such as time and resources and those who have to carry the cost will be resistant for 
change. Once formed, people learn through institutions and construct their behavior 
and preferences accordingly. People learn about the rules and make commitments 
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based on the existing rules and they get used to living in that structure. They develop 
new ideas complementary to the system. Uncertainty arising from collective choice 
situations in everyday life can be overcome by institutions. Normative power of 
institutions is another factor of path dependency. As North pointed out: “Institutions 
are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3). Institutions construct rules 
that shape norms affecting people’s decisions. 
If path deviation is difficult, how do institutions change? Critical junctures 
caused by exogenous shocks such as economic crises and wars may result in radical 
changes in institutions. Such critical junctures are not easily identifiable in advance 
but they demolish the old state systems and create a situation in indeterminate flux in 
those states (Thelen, 1999; Collier & Collier, 1991; Krasner, 1978). In such a situation, 
the new system has many possible directions to follow to setup a new path and policy 
choices during the setup process will shape the future of the system. In Kosovo after 
the 1999 war, there occurred a flux situation where the UN could give the direction for 
a new path. This study explores two potential roles for the UN in post-conflict Kosovo. 
The first one occurs at the end of the war: first role is to give direction for a path to 
new state institutions. The second one occurs after state institutions are created: to 
sustain these institutions until they are institutionalized and become mature enough to 
stay on their own feet. I argue that there is a large-room for the UN in peacebuilding 
because the UN has the experience and lessons learned from its history and also the 
material capacity to deliver long-term planned missions. Peacebuilding in post-war 
societies demands long-term, fully committed, and multi-tasked missions, in which the 
UN has more success and further potential thanks to its legitimacy among conflicting 
parties as well as its international and regional ties to cooperate with different actors 
on the ground. The UN has more opportunities in the long-run because almost all of 
the states in the world are its members, it is the only international forum where all the 
states discuss about the threat to international peace and security, and it has the 
necessary resources such as budget and personnel to engage with post-conflict 
peacebuilding. Moreover, thanks to its large number of members the UN has good ties 
to cooperate with NGOs, ROs, other IOs, and local conflicting parties. The members 
of regional organizations are also members of the UN making them easy to work with 
and dividing the burden of complicated peacebuilding tasks. Once the UN sets the path 
for state institutions in cooperation with the NGOs and conflicting parties, the rest will 
23 
 
be set as a path dependent process. But the decision on when to leave the country is 
crucial because local actors should be able to perform state functions by themselves 
and state institutions should function successfully before the full exit of the UN.  
When does the local political institutions become mature enough so that the 
UN can exit? The answer lies in Huntington’s criteria for successful institutions. He 
argues “the scope of support and the level of institutionalization” are two indicators of 
whether institutions are successful or not (1973: 12). The scope of support in 
internationally governed territory is problematic in the sense it is a post-war 
environment and institutions are challenged by opposing domestic actors. As my case 
study is Kosovo, the support of elite and population at large are observed in the period 
of first institutional setup (1999) to the independence of Kosovo (2008). The support 
of elites can be observed in their compliance with institutions and in their public 
rhetoric or writings (Diamond, 1999) and the polls of UN Development Program on 
popular satisfaction with institutions are our sources to measure public support.  
The second indicator of successful institutionalization depends on the 
institution’s: (1) adaptability, (2) complexity, (3) autonomy, and (4) coherence (1973: 
12-24).  
Adaptability refers to sensitivity of institutions to challenges in a changing 
environment in time and spaces. Huntington proposes three signs of adaptability; age, 
successful secession of leaders, and functional flexibility. The older an institution, the 
more the number of successful secession of leaders have taken place, and the more 
flexible an institution to function, the more adaptable it is.  
Complexity presupposes: “The greater the number and variety of subunits the 
greater the ability of the organization to secure and maintain the loyalties of its 
members”. The more internally differentiated structure brings more efficiency.  
Autonomy is ability to perform its duties on its own without the effects of 
social groupings according to Huntington but in this study, autonomy refers to the 
functioning of domestic institutions independent of international help. The 
independence from internationals have come through stages in Kosovo. Based on the 
reports of the Special Envoys and Secretary-Generals in Kosovo, the administrative 
authority was gradually transmitted to locals.  
Coherence means coordination and discipline within institutions. He argues: 
“Discipline and development go hand in hand.” The functional boundaries of 
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institutions and problem solving procedures within those boundaries should be agreed. 
And institutions should be able to take coherent decisions. 
This study focuses on the UN institution-building program on three institutions 
at the central state level in Kosovo: the presidency, the government, and parliament. 
These three institutions are chosen because the UNSC Resolution 1244 authorized the 
UN to create a self-government in Kosovo and they are the cornerstones of a 
government.  
If successful state institutions promote peace as this study argues, how is it 
possible to estimate peace in a post-conflict country? The assessment of the degree of 
peace is done through Galtung’s triangle model for conflict shown in the Figure 3, 
below (1996: 72).  
 
Figure 2.2. Galtung’s triangles of conflict and violence 
 
According to Galtung, the main reason of conflict is contradiction or 
incompatibility which is located at the top of the conflict triangle. Contradiction occurs 
due to the incompatibility of goals between conflicting parties. Violent attitude and 
behavior are at the base of the triangle. Whereas attitude refers to the conflicting 
parties’ perceptions of each other and themselves, behavior includes visible elements 
such as hostile threats and attacks. Galtung argues all three elements have to exist for 
a full conflict (Galtung, 1996: 72-73). Based on its identification of conflict elements, 
he proposed a triangle of violence, namely structural violence, cultural violence, and 
direct violence, which are related to the triangle of elements: contradiction, attitude, 
and behavior, respectively. He then argues in order to achieve sustainable peace, all 
three types of violence must be addressed. Peacemaking measures can stop direct 
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violence therefore behavior of conflicting parties but for sustainable peace removing 
incompatibilities and changing attitudes are also necessary. 
2.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed the existing literature on the UN’s role in conflict 
resolution and shed light on the gaps and disagreements in it. Then I clarified my key 
terms: conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. Later, I constructed my 
argument on the UN involvement in post-conflict peacebuilding. According to this 
study, the UN is more effective in peacebuilding rather than peacemaking due to the 
nature of its decision-making structure that I will discuss further in the empirical 
chapter where I apply my argument to the case of Kosovo. What makes the UN 
efficient in peacebuilding is its composite structure enabling it to carry the long-term 
burden of peacebuilding missions. Right after the war in Kosovo, there occurred a flux 
situation ready to construct state institutions from the beginning. State institutions 
should be given priority in peacebuilding missions since successful state institutions 
promote self-sustaining peace in post-war societies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
NEW BORN KOSOVO POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
3.1. Introduction  
In this chapter, I will give a brief background of the Kosovo conflict, which 
turned out to be a war, in 1998. This background is important to mention in order to 
trace the attempts of the UN to resolve the conflict and the reasons for its failure to 
stop it. Why NATO intervened in 1999 in the Kosovo War and what happened right 
after the war stopped in the name of peacebuilding are covered from 1999 to 2002. 
This time period is chosen because it is the period when the UN started to plant the 
seeds of new political institutions of Kosovo. As the UN could not pass a resolution 
authorizing the use of force against the Yugoslav regime, NATO interfered without a 
legal ground. However, the military intervention alone does not necessarily prevent 
recurrence of violence in the aftermath of war since the underlying reasons of the 
conflict were not yet resolved. The UN presence was possible at this stage to create a 
sustainable peace in Kosovo through directing the way for sustainable political 
institutions. This chapter analyses the initial steps of institution building by the UN. 
How the UN led the initial process of institution building is important to investigate as 
this research argues the first steps create a path dependency where further 
developments are affected by the previous ones.  
3.2. Towards NATO peacemaking: a brief historical background of the 
Kosovo war  
Under the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 Kosovo was an autonomous province 
of the Republic of Serbia in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). 
With the amendment of the constitution by Slobodan Milosevic in 1989, Kosovo lost 
its autonomy and became only a province of the Republic of Serbia. In response, 
Kosovo Albanians formed a new party, Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja 
Demokratike te Kosovës, LDK), under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova. With the 
independence of other Yugoslav republics, Kosovo Albanians wished the same for 
Kosovo. The LDK established a parallel government and held a referendum for 
independence and elections for presidency in subsequent years. Their struggle for 
independence was through peaceful political means (Mertus, 1999: 270) and it was 
defined as “passive resistance” in the literature (Mertus, 1999: 307; Economides, 
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2007:221). With no change in the side of Milosevic government, Rugova hoped to get 
support from international community under the Dayton Peace Agreement.7 However, 
there was no mention of Kosovo at the Dayton Peace deal and no progress towards 
independence. In response, an armed resistance erupted under the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA).  The KLA was established in the early 1990s, but remained passive until 
1996 due to the lack of support in violent means of struggle against Serbia among 
majority of Albanians after the brutal wars in Croatia and Bosnia (Judah, 2002:21). 
The KLA was able to get support from the majority of Kosovo Albanians after Kosovo 
was left unnamed in the Dayton. The KLA referred to Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia 
as successful cases as they achieved independence not through “passive resistance” 
but through conflict (Economides, 2007: 222; Mertus, 1999: 307). The situation 
deteriorated when Serbian military forces responded the KLA (O’Neill, 2001).  
The UNSC issued the Resolution 1160 on 31 March 1998 and called for a 
peaceful settlement. It both condemned the Serbian and KLA forces and emphasized 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY (Para. 3-7). To avoid any 
occurrence of genocide similar to the Bosnian case, the war had to be stopped, but the 
UN could not issue a resolution to stop Serbian forces through military means. This 
was the case due to the lack of unanimity among the permanent five members of the 
UNSC. Although the UNSC passed the Resolution 1199 on 23 September 1998 that 
threatened Milosevic by a possible use of force, Russia, also backed by China, 
continuously refused to approve any resolution related to the sovereignty of Serbia. 
Both Russia and China kept referring to the non-intervention principle of the UN 
Charter with regard to domestic issues of sovereign states. In order to protect its 
traditional ally, Russia also opposed any measures taken out of the UN auspices so that 
she could secure the right to veto any decisions against Serbia’s interests (Murphy, 
2009: 72-74).8 Due to the act or threat of using veto power of its permanent members 
such as Russia and China, peacemaking in a short span of time was not possible from 
the UN’s side.  
                                                          
7 The Dayton Agreement brought about the end of Bosnian War in 1995. Rugova reduced 
the tensions among Albanian Kosovars towards the Serbs as a barrier in front of their 
independence by saying that the Kosovo issue would be discussed at the Dayton Agreement.  
8 Russia also feared of losing its impact on the developments in the Balkans if UNSC would 
authorize NATO’s military campaign (Wolff, 2005:88). 
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3.2.1. Rambouillet Accords 
The UN called Albanian Kosovars and the Milosevic regime to sign an 
agreement in Rambouillet under the aegis of six nations, called as the Contact Group.9 
Albanian Kosovars perceived it as a chance to convince the international community 
for Kosovo’s independence. However, the representatives of the Albanian community 
kept refusing the draft proposed by the Contact Group as it did not give independence 
to Kosovo. Meanwhile, the FRY representative supported many political concessions 
as the process was deadlocked by the Albanians already. After overwhelming 
pressures from the Contact Group to Albanian Kosovars, they accepted the deal. It was 
then the side of FRY began to refuse to sign the final draft by arguing that it was 
against the sovereignty of the FRY. According to the agreement, Kosovo would obtain 
a high level of autonomy with its own political institutions within the FRY. Serbia was 
warned by NATO many times for possible military operation if it did not cease its 
military campaign in Kosovo and sign the Rambouillet agreement. However, 
Milosevic did not accept the agreement as it would mean a loss of its political power 
that relied on nationalism (Economides, 2007).  
After the failure in Rambouillet talks, NATO intervened in Kosovo on 24 
March 1999. Throughout its 11-week air campaign, called as the operation Allied 
Force, NATO demanded the Yugoslav forces to withdraw from Kosovo and sign an 
agreement for possible political and military frameworks for an autonomous Kosovo 
(Fromkin, 1999). Yugoslavia accepted a peace plan on 10 June 1999 and withdrew its 
forces from Kosovo. It was then, after the war was ceased, the UN was on the ground 
through UNSC Resolution 1244 (Blitz, 2006). 
3.3. The United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo 
 UNSC Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999 brought about the creation of a United 
Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). According to the Resolution 
1244, UNMIK was responsible for: 
(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial 
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and 
of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); 
(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions as long as required; 
                                                          
9 The Contact Group is an informal grouping of six nations; the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany and Russia. They first started to work on the Bosnian 
conflict and later took part in the Kosovo conflict.  
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(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for 
democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, 
including the holding of elections;  
(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative 
responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s 
local provisional institutions and other peacebuilding activities (UN Security 
Council, 1999, p. 3-4). 
UNMIK had four pillars at the beginning in 1999: Pillar one consisted of 
humanitarian assistance through the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), pillar two was about civil administration led by the UN, pillar 
three included multi-ethnic democracy and institution building led by the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and pillar four composed of 
economic development with the help of the EU This divided mission was headed by 
the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (UN Special Representative)10 
and each pillar had a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General as shown 
in the Figure 4 below (Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo: S/2002/1126: 9).11 In security area NATO-led 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) was also authorized by the same resolution.12 
                                                          
10 UN Special Representatives appointed to head UNMIK from 1999 to 2008 were as 
follows: Bernard Kouchner (1999-2001), Hans Haekkerup (2001-2002), Michael Steiner 
(2002-2003), Harri Holkeri (2003-2004), Sören Jessen—Petersen (2004-2006) and Joachim 
Ruecker (2006-2008). Available at: http://www.unmikonline.org/Pages/SRSGs.aspx 
11 After the great number of refugees returned pillar one was closed down in June 2000 and 
later it was given the responsibility of the rule of law functions in May 2001. Throughout the 
gradual transfer of authorities to the local institutions pillar 1 and 2 were closed down in 
2006 and pillar 4 in 2008. Pillar 3 is still functioning (UNMIK/PR/1606, 15 November 2006; 
UNMIK Fact Sheet June 2008). 
12 KFOR was composed of 50,000 troops. The number of troops was decreased to around 
39,000 by 2002, 26,000 by 2003, and in 2016 around 5,500 troops exist in Kosovo. 
Available at NATO KFOR Website: 
http://www.shape.nato.int/kfor/about-us/history 
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Figure 3.1: UNMIK Four Pillars 
* The UN took the leading role in institution building in the beginning of the mission 
rather than the OSCE. The OSCE supported the institutions after they were 
established by the UN (F. Mulolli, personal communication, August 5, 2015). 
 
3.3.1. A New Path for Kosovo: How has the UN built up state 
institutions? The initial steps from 1999 to 2001 
After the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo the UN was faced with 
three different parallel structures acting independent from each other. These three 
government structures were headed by the LDK, the KLA, and pre-war Serbian 
structures. In majority-Serbian-lived municipalities the pre-war regulations of the 
Republic of Serbia continued to function, whereas in majority-Albanian-lived 
municipalities the KLA claimed of legitimate governance. The LDK at the same time 
had its administrations in different areas such as health care and education in Albanian 
dominated municipalities. 
In order to implement its mandate of establishing self-government in Kosovo, 
UNMIK needed to have an authority throughout Kosovo, however, the parallel 
structures challenged UNMIK to create integrative government structures. In order to 
bring different segments of the society to the table, UNMIK created the Kosovo 
Transitional Council as a forum where they could claim their demands and came up 
with a consensus. The formation of Kosovo Transitional Council was the first step in 
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state-building project of UNMIK that was defined as “marking a critical first step 
towards development of self-government in Kosovo” (UNMIK/PR/12, 16 July 1999). 
3.3.2. The Kosovo Transitional Council 
Although Resolution 1244 gave a wide range of authority to UNMIK as the 
only legitimate administrative body of Kosovo, it was not possible to use that authority 
without the support of local communities. The Kosovo Transitional Council was 
created in line with this need to bring different local communities together to decide 
on their future under the chairmanship of the UN Special Representative. According 
to UNMIK the Kosovo Transitional Council would “offer the main political parties 
and ethnic communities in Kosovo an opportunity for direct input into the decision-
making process” and would “serve as a forum where the parties can work together 
towards achieving consensus on a broad range of issues relating to civil administration, 
institution building, reconstruction and essential services” (UNMIK/PR/12, 16 July 
1999). The Kosovo Transitional Council was the consultative body to the executive 
authority of Kosovo, UNMIK. However, the leaders of parallel structures did not 
dissolve their governments while attending the meetings of the Council until the first 
UN Special Representative, Bernard Kouchner, called them to join an interim 
administrative structure together.  
3.3.3. Joint Interim Administrative Structure 
On 15 December 1999, the Kosovo Transitional Council agreed to establish 
the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). It was aimed local politicians would 
be integrated more in decision making process and UNMIK would take one step 
further to “establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic 
self-governing institutions” (UNSCR 1244). The JIAS included the Kosovo 
Transitional Council, the Interim Administrative Council, and nineteen administrative 
departments.13 The Kosovo Transitional Council was extended to 36 members in order 
                                                          
13 The fourteen departments were: (1) Finance and Economic Development, (2) 
Reconstruction and Donor Co-ordination, (3) Business Administration and Commerce, (4) 
Education and Science, (5) Culture, (6) Civil Affairs, (7) Justice, (8) Transport, Post, and 
Telecommunication, (9) Health and Social Welfare, (10) Agriculture and Environmental 
Protection, (11) Civil Security and Emergency Relief, (12) Democratization and Media 
Development, (13) Local Administration, and (14) Emigration (Annex to UNMIK 
Regulation No.2000/1). They were extended to nineteen departments on 5 January 2000 as: 
(1) Budget and Finance, (2) Reconstruction, (3) Trade and Industry, (4) Education and 
Science, (5) Culture, (6) Youth and Sport, (7) Public Services, (8) Justice, (9) Transport and 
Infrastructure, (10) Post and Telecommunications, (11) Utilities, (12) Heath and Social 
Security, (13) Labour, (14) Agriculture, (15) Environment, (16) Civil Security and 
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to include more different local groups and given the role of a “shadow-assembly” to 
the Interim Administrative Council (Rexhepi, 2012:130).  
The Interim Administrative Council was the highest government-like body in 
JIAS and it made policy recommendations to the UN Special Representative and 
formed policy guidelines to other departments within JIAS. The Interim 
Administrative Council consisted of eight members: four internationals, three Kosovo 
Albanians, one Kosovo Serb, and two observers from civil society 
(UNMIK/REG/2000/1). International members were from UNMIK staff, Kosovo 
Albanians were those who represented Kosovo in the Rambouillet negotiations 
(Ibrahim Rugova of LDK, Hashim Taçi of Democratic Party of Kosovo14, and Rexhep 
Qasja of the United Democratic Movement). The Serbian member was Rada 
Trajkovic.  
As there was no election held at that time, the representatives were chosen 
based on their electoral strength (King & Mason, 2006). The Serbian community did 
not send a representative for four months of the creation of JIAS, but later on they 
decided to have an observer position in the Interim Administrative Council (Covey, 
2005). The UN Special Representative kept his position as the head of the mission if 
the Interim Administrative Council was not able to reach a consensus, he would have 
the last word. UNMIK was able to convince Albanian Kosovar leaders to dissolve their 
parallel governments by the time of JIAS formation, except for the Serbian authority. 
Serbian community formed the Serbian National Council and rejected the authority of 
JIAS in the first place. However, by April 2000, they also sent two co-heads to 
administrative departments and one for the Interim Administrative Council, Rada 
Trajkovic as mentioned above, as an observer (Brand, 2003). Rada Trajkovic protested 
against the JIAS in response to violence directed at the Serbian Kosovars, however, 
the UN Special Representative had successful negotiations that resulted in her return 
to the JIAS. Overall, UNMIK succeeded to convince pre-war leaders to sit with it and 
recognize its authority throughout Kosovo. Despite the barriers in its decision making 
process in terms of peacemaking, the UN was on the positive track in peacebuilding 
through its credibility and legitimacy on the ground in Kosovo. Its accumulated 
                                                          
Emergency Preparedness, (17) Democratization and Civil Society, (18) Local 
Administration, and (19) Non-residents Affairs (UNMIK/PR/124). 
14 Hashim Taçi first formed the Party for the Democratic Progress of Kosovo (PPDK) and it 
was renamed as the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) 
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experiences in war shattered societies shed light on its engagements with warring 
parties in Kosovo. The UN started its peacebuilding missions with the incorporation 
of three conflicting parties, the KLA, the LDK, and Serbian political elites.   
3.3.4. Process of Formation of a Provisional Self-Government  
Although UNMIK tried to include locals more in time in order to establish a 
self-government, as elections were not still held and the UN Special Representative 
was the ultimate decision maker in case of a lack of consensus, the political institutions 
remained highly elite and international level excluding the public at large. 
Nevertheless, the process of insttution building was started with the formation of the 
Kosovo Transitional Council, which led to the formation of JIAS and later led to the 
formation of the Provisional Self-Government, as shown in the Figure 5, below. As 
the Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi stated in an interview: ^Our biggest handicap is 
the lack of experience, but our big advantage is that we have started from zero; we 
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established towards more functioning and locally owned government institutions from 
zero point. The executive Director at the Centre for Research, Documentation and 
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would welcome anyone. UNMIK laid the ground. It is like giving birth to a baby. We 
wanted to build our country and we needed help as we did not have experience in 
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3.3.4.1. The First Post-War Elections in October 2000 (Municipal 
Elections) 
The first municipal elections in Kosovo paved the way for establishing 
administrative institutions at the local governmental level. UNMIK formed the 
conduct of the municipal elections with different regulations on the political party 
registration and civl registry and the establishment of the Central Election 
Commission (UNMIK/REG/2000/21). Accordingly, candidates were chosen for a 
two-year term from open lists by a propositional representation system. In addition, 
each party list had to include at least thirty percent of female candidates in the first 
fifteen candidates (UNMIK/REG/2000/39). 
 
                                                          
15
 The full text is available on http://www.winne.com/topinterviews/Rexhepi.htm [last visit 
20.04.2016] 
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Table 3.1. Chronology of Developments in Political Institution building of Kosovo 
 
  
Voter turnout was 79 percent on the first municipal elections16 and there was 
no occurrence of incidents. The LDK won the 58 percent of the vote, whereas the PDK 
received the 27 percent of the vote. There were two surprising results. The first one 
was about the third party, which had seats in both at the Interim Administrative and 
Kosovo Transition Councils, the UDM, as it took less than 1 percent. And a new party 
                                                          
16 There were still Kosovar refugees outside Kosovo, therefore, International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) organized out of country voting (OCV) program for those residing 
abroad. Available at: 
https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/mepmm/op_support/esu
_ocv_080107.pdf 
35 
 
called the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) under the leadership of a former 
KLA guerrilla commander received 8 percent of the vote. The Serbian Kosovars did 
not recognize the elections and refused to vote. Overall, after the first elections 27 out 
of 30 municipalities established their municipal assemblies and for the remaining 
three, where majority Serbian Kosovars lived, the UN Special Representative 
appointed the assembly members and governors. Although the first municipal 
elections set the path for further improvement in local administrations, the lack of a 
legal framework made people of Kosovo suspicious towards the developments in 
institution building. Since there was no clear legal framework about the governance of 
Kosovo, and Kosovars were not given prior notification of the decisions taken, 
UNMIK started to create a constitutional framework which would lead to the 
formation of a central government through free and fair elections. 
3.3.4.2. Constitutional Framework  
UN Special Representative called for the creation of a Joint Working Group 
composed of 13 members, seven Kosovars and six internationals, and a chairman.17 
The Joint Working Group worked on a constitutional framework to define a 
provisional self-government for Kosovo. After some disputes on the name of the draft, 
the existence of a presidency, and the necessity of the approval from Belgrade to the 
new draft “Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo” 
was completed on 15 May 2001.18 According to the Constitutional Framework, 
Kosovo provisional institutions of self-government were the Assembly, the 
Presidency, the Government and courts. Two levels of government were also 
established: the municipal level (the basic territorial units of the self-government) and 
the central level.  
The President was elected by the Assembly for three year term and the 
President appointed the Prime Minister. Having such an institution, the Presidency, 
                                                          
17 Kosovo members were from the Interim Administration Councils: Fatmir Sejdiu (LDK), 
Arsim Bajrami (PDK) and Muhammet Kelmendi (AAK). The Kosovo Serb member was 
Djordje Aleksic and Abedin Ferovic, a Bosniac, represented other communities. Blerim 
Reka was the representative of civil society and Blerim Shala was appointed in his personal 
capacity. International members were as follows: Andrew Joscelyne (Pillar III), NN (Pillar 
II), Roy Dickinson (Pillar IV), Alexander Borg-Olivier (UNMIK Legal Advisor), and 
Neithardt Hoefer-Wissing (UNMIK, Office of Political Affairs), and an international expert 
from the Venice Commission (Matthew Russell and Thomas Markert to rotate). The 
chairman was Mr. Johan Van Lamoen (UNMIK/PR/516). 
18 For the discussion on the disputes over the legal framework see: UNMIK Press Briefing 
JWG on the Legal Framework Press Briefing: 13 April 2001 
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was highly debated in the Joint Working Group. As International Crisis Group (ICG) 
reports: “Provision for a president of Kosovo was of key symbolic importance for 
Kosovo Albanians, although it was opposed by international representatives on the 
Joint Working Group and in the Kosovo Serb community. The need for a figurehead, 
even if the post is largely symbolic, is seen as important by Kosovo Albanians. A 
president is seen as a head-of-state in waiting, which affirms Albanians’ aspiration to 
statehood” (Report No 120, 2001:7). The president was indeed given a symbolic role 
in the Constitutional Framework. He was there to “represent the unity of the people 
and guarantee the democratic functioning of the Provisional Institutions of Self 
Government.” He was not even directly elected by the people and he needed to consult 
with the Assembly to appoint a prime minister (UNMIK/RG/2001/9: Article 9.2.1).  
The Assembly was envisaged as “the highest representative and legislative 
Provisional Institution of Self Government of Kosovo” by the Constitutional 
Framework (UNMIK/RG/2001/9: Article 9.1.1). It had one chamber with 120 seats. 
Twenty seats were reserved as follows: ten for the Serbian community, four for the 
Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities, three for the Bosniak community, two for 
the Turkish community, and one for the Gorani community. The Assembly was 
assigned to adopt laws and resolutions, endorse or reject the prime minister and 
government, and establish committees to check legislation. The Constitutional 
Framework designed a proportional representation electoral system and made Kosovo 
a single member district with secret candidate ballots. Multi-district system would be 
problematic in the initial stage as there was a lack of up-to-date population data. Open-
list was used in the municipal elections and voters put women candidates at the bottom 
of their preferences. With closed-list and a requirement for parties to list a woman in 
every group of three candidates over the first two-thirds of their list, the place of 
woman was secured. Moreover, the reserved seats of minorities obliged powerful 
parties to win 61 out of 100 seats to have an Assembly majority (ICG Report No 120, 
2001).  
The Government was the executive authority implementing laws and 
proposing draft laws to the Assembly. The Prime Minister was the head of the 
government and nominated the ministers who were chosen by the Assembly. These 
provisional institutions began to function after the first general elections in November 
2001. The elections from 2000 to 2007 is shown in the Table 3.1, below. 
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Table 3.2. Kosovo Elections 1999-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After the first general elections JIAS administrative departments mentioned 
above began to function under nine ministries: Agriculture; Forestry and Rural 
Development; Culture, Youth and Sports; Education, Science and Technology; Labor 
and Social Welfare; Health, Environment and Spatial Planning; Transport and 
Communications; Public Services; Trade and Industry; and Finance and Economy.  
The reserved powers of the UN Special Representative are also important to 
mention as they are related to the “self-ness” of the first political institutions of 
Kosovo. By the Constitutional Framework, the UN Special Representative had his 
authority in “dissolving the assembly and calling for new elections … setting the 
financial and policy parameters … exercising final authority regarding the 
appointment, removal from office and disciplining of judges and prosecutors … 
concluding agreements with states and international organizations” (UNMIK 
Regulation No. 2001/9). Due to the fact that the final status of Kosovo was not set yet 
according to UNSCR 1244, the powers given to the new born political institutions 
were carefully chosen. UNMIK aimed not to cause any prejudice on the mind of both 
Serbian and Albanian Kosovars about independence of Kosovo. Also, in post-war era 
security issues were given priority: “While the Constitutional Framework does hand 
over responsibility to the newly elected government in a broad range of areas, key 
powers are reserved for the SRSG. In many cases that is only logical under current 
circumstances. Given the continuing unsatisfactory security situation within Kosovo 
and on Kosovo's borders, and the continuing need for a heavy KFOR presence, it 
would clearly be unrealistic at this stage for control over internal or external security 
to be devolved to local control” (ICG Report No 120, 2001:6-7). UNMIK transferred 
powers related to local level of administration to the PISG in the initial phase which is 
discussed Chapter 4 in the institutional autonomy section. 
Date Election Type 
28 October 2000 Municipal Elections 
17 November 2001 Assembly Elections 
26 October 2002 Municipal Elections 
23 October 2004 Assembly Elections 
17 November 2007 Assembly and Municipal Elections 
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3.3.4.3. First General Elections 
Kosovars voted for the first time for their representatives on 17 November 
2001. The general election was the second election taken Kosovo wide. Comparing to 
the first Municipal elections of 2000, ICG defined the general elections as “to have 
been a clear improvement on the municipal elections of October 2000. Levels of 
violence were much lower, even though more voters took part” (2001). The Serbian 
community also mostly attended the vote, but due to the ambiguity in perceptions of 
different Serbian leaders towards the elections, some Serbian Kosovars hesitated to 
vote. Three major parties of the Municipal elections took the majority of votes in the 
general elections as well. The LDK won 45.6 percent of vote, whereas the PDK took 
25.7 percent. The AAK received 7.8 percent of the vote. The Serbian Coalition Return 
Party had 11.3 percent of the overall vote. The voter turnout was a concerning issue as 
it was stated as 64 percent. It was a decline from 78 percent in the Municipal elections. 
However, the number of people registered, who were eligible to vote, including the 
Serbian community, was lower in 2000. In the Municipal elections 913,179 people 
were eligible to vote and in the general elections the number was 1.25 million. 
Therefore, it was not a matter of decline in the voter turnout as Serbians also attended 
the elections that increased the total turnout (OSCE Kosovo Assembly Elections 2001, 
Certified Results).  
The LDK could not win the two-thirds majority seats in the Assembly, hence, 
it was not able to form a government. In order to get the support of the PDK, the LDK 
offered it five ministries. However, the PDK held out for the prime ministry to be filled 
by a PDK member since it won 26 seats. The PDK asked for one of three key positions, 
especially the prime ministry, because they thought if the prime minister was from the 
LDK their ministries could be easily dismissed and they could be out of government 
decision making process (ICG Report No.125, 2002). After three months, the two 
dominant parties agreed to give the presidency to the LDK (Ibrahim Rugova was 
chosen as the first President of Kosovo) and the prime ministry to the PDK (Bajram 
Rexhepi was the first Prime Minister) (UNMIK/PR/698, 28 February 2002).  
3.4. Conclusion 
The UN’s failure in conflict prevention and peacemaking in Kosovo did not 
mean it did not pursue peace in peacebuilding process. With its various channels the 
UN created an umbrella mission in Kosovo under which different organizations shared 
the duties of peacebuilding. Although Russia and China prevented the UN to take 
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necessary measures against Milosevic regime at the UNSC, the UN pursued peace in 
Kosovo after NATO’s military campaign. How did the UN lead its endeavor on 
creating sustainable peace in Kosovo? 
The analyses on the initial set up process of institution building in Kosovo by 
the UN gives us opportunity to process trace further developments in the institution 
building project. From 1999 to early 2002, as chronologically shown in the Figure 5 
above, with its mandate under the UNSC Resolution 1244 UNMIK worked on to set a 
path for political institutions of Kosovo so that Kosovars would have their self-
government in the future. As the status of Kosovo was declared as “pending” in the 
Resolution 1244, UNMIK tried to establish political institutions carefully in order not 
to breach any decision taken by the UNSC. Starting with the Kosovo Transitional 
Council, UNMIK worked with major parties of pre-war era. As there were security 
concerns and displaced people who were not resettled, UNMIK did not rush for 
elections. The lack of elections questioned the legitimacy of second institution, the 
JIAS, since apart from the Kosovo Administrative Council, the JIAS was aimed to 
give more opportunities to Kosovars to be integrated in decision making process. After 
the first Municipal elections, UNMIK proved the parties to the Kosovo Administrative 
Council and later to the JIAS were rightly chosen, as they received the majority of 
votes, except for including the UDM and excluding the AAK. The need for a legal 
draft to lay down the ground for political institutions was sustained through a group 
composed of both internationals and locals. The Constitutional Framework was the 
cornerstone of the new direction for Kosovo’s political institutions. It created the three 
essential political institutions: the Presidency, the Prime Ministry, and the 
Government. How they would be elected and how they would function were 
determined with the Constitutional Framework.  
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CHAPTER 4 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF KOSOVO POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 This chapter analyzes the degree of success in Kosovo’s political institutions 
that were created and have been sustained primarily by the UN. The criteria to judge 
the institutional success is derived from Huntington’s (1968) criteria for successful 
institutions, which suggests it is possible to measure institutional success through the 
scope of support and the level of institutionalization an institution has. This chapter 
starts with the examination of institutionalization in Kosovo with four indicators: (1) 
adaptability, (2) complexity, (3) autonomy, and (4) coherence. Then it moves to the 
scope of support. As this thesis argues the most significant and effective role of the 
UN in conflict resolution is not only constructing war-shattered political institutions 
but also devising and maintaining new institutions until they become self-sustaining. 
Societies with well-functioning institutions are more prone to long-lasting peace, 
therefore, the level of functionality or the success is important to conclude whether 
established institutions are on the path of self-sustainability or not. The UN in this case 
is expected to create the path of successful institutions in Kosovo in the aftermath of 
war through its support in institution building as well as in capacity building. The UN 
can do better in statebuilding as it can establish institutions and sustain them through 
its resources, legitimacy and policing. However, as the statebuilding in Kosovo is an 
ongoing project and not complete yet, this study is not empirically justified with the 
available evidence. Therefore, the emphasis is given to the degree of 
institutionalization and the institutional support of the past, present, and its 
implications for the future. So the primary question of this chapter is: Is there an 
increasing trend in terms of the criteria for institutional success in the UN’s active 
participation over years? Have the UN been able to support the domestic institutions 
in capacity building? Did Kosovo declare independence in 2008 thanks to its domestic 
institutions primarily designed and supported by the UN? After answering these 
questions, in the conclusion part, I connect the institutionalization debate to the degree 
of peace in Kosovo based on Galtung’s conflict and peace triangles.   
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4.2. The Level of Institutionalization  
Institutionalization is an indicator of success for institutions because it brings 
“value and stability” to them (Huntington 1965: 394). Institutionalization shows itself 
in an institution’s level of adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. Change 
is the key in institutionalization and the positive or negative trend in the change 
displays either further institutionalization or de-institutionalization (Eisenstadt 1964). 
This section applies these four criteria to new-born Kosovo institutions in order to 
illustrate the trend of change in the institutionalization process. 
4.2.1. Institutional Adaptability 
Huntington (1968) uses three indicators to evaluate adaptability of an 
institution in the institutionalization process: (1) age, (2) successful succession of 
leaders, and (3) functionality. He argues the older an institution is, the more the number 
of successful succession of leaders have taken place, and the more flexible an 
institution is to function, the more adaptable it is. If Kosovo’s political institutions are 
analyzed through these three indicators for their level of institutionalization, the first 
indicator, the age, starts from 16 July 1999 with the creation of the Kosovo Transitional 
Council as shown in the chronology table in Chapter Three. Political institutions in 
Kosovo were new-born after the war of 1999 and they did not inherit institutional 
structures from the pre-war regimes. As the Kosovo Transitional Council later 
integrated to the Joint Interim Administrative Structures whose members later became 
officials in the PISG, it is a good starting time for the chronological age of political 
institutions.   
The second indicator stresses the successful succession of leaders. In Kosovo, 
there were three general elections as shown in Table 3.1 in Chapter Three. First 
coalition government was formed after almost four months of the elections in 2001 by 
the LDK, the PDK, the AAK, and the Kosovo Serb Coalition Return (Koalitija 
Povratak, KP). This was the case due to the deadlock on the decisions of appointing 
the prime minister and the president. However, the second coalition government of the 
LDK and the AAK was formed in less than a month in 2004 and the SRSG commented 
in its formation as follows: “Immediately after the elections, I urged the political 
parties to act on the voices of the voters by moving quickly, and they have done so, 
without international involvement” (UNMIK/PR/1270, 17 November 2004). In 2007, 
the PDK and the LDK formed a coalition government. In the institution of Presidency, 
the first president Ibrahim Rugova was elected in 2002 and he was reelected in 2004. 
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In the third consecutive term, Fatmir Sejdiu came into office in 2006.19 The president 
is appointed by the Assembly and apart from the first appointment the rest was 
successful in terms of duration on the decision making about the president. For 
example, after the death of Rugova before the third general elections the Assembly 
was quick in appointing Fatmir Sejdiu as his successor (UNMIK/PR/1787, 10 
February 2006). The first Prime Minister was Bajram Rexhepi and he was replaced by 
Ramush Haradinaj in the second term. However, Haradinaj was charged by the ICTY 
and he resigned voluntarily. The Assembly elected the new Prime Minister, Bajram 
Kosumi, and only in three weeks the new government with small changes in the 
cabinet was ready to continue. After a year of his office Bajram Kosumi also resigned 
but he was smoothly replaced by Agim Çeku in a short span of time (European 
Commission Progress Report, 2005).  
The third indicator, functionality, implies the ability of institutions to perform 
their prescribed functions. In functionality analysis, I answer two questions: What 
duties were assigned by the Constitutional Framework to the Presidency, the 
Assembly, and the Government and whether they were performed successfully or not 
from their establishment in 2001 to 2008. In the initial steps fundamental things were 
missing in all institutions creating deficiencies in their performances such as buildings 
for ministries and staffing of government officials (ICG, 2006). There observed some 
lack of functionality in the first terms of institutions but they were more functional in 
the next terms.  
According to the Constitutional Framework, the President had to present a 
report to the Assembly at least once a year. The first president, Ibrahim Rugova, 
presented his first report after two years of his office. However, after the first report in 
2004, the Presidents continued their annual address to the Assembly. The President 
was banned of having a political office other than the presidency. Rugova resisted to 
be the President of his party, the LDK, until the warnings of UNMIK in 2005. On the 
duty of representing the unity of people according to the Constitutional Framework the 
Presidency failed to resolve the conflict in the parliament among opposition parties 
about the rules of procedure in its initial period. It was UNMIK’s initiative to create a 
Political Forum to discuss debated issues (Willigen, 2009: 134). The rules of procedure 
                                                          
19  Presidents of Kosovo available on http://www.president-ksgov.net/?page=2,109 [last visit 
on 24.05.2016] 
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for the legislation process was created by international experts and adopted by the 
Kosovo Assembly, but when the Assembly began to function some practical changes 
on the existing rules were necessary. Although UNMIK did not recognize a new draft 
proposed by the Assembly, the Assembly functioned with their new rules of procedure. 
The OSCE in charge of capacity building of the PISG members criticized the Kosovo 
government of being problematic in the legislative drafting process as well as the 
implementation process. Implementation processes of new laws remained long due to 
“the priority given by ministries on preparing new draft laws within their respective 
fields of activities to be presented to the Assembly, another is the lack of sufficient 
resources in the legal offices” (OSCE, 2005: 20). Another reason for the slow pace of 
implementation was the lack of opposition in the first legislature period (Rexhepi, 
2012). Kosovo had a grand coalition in the first place including almost all parties but 
in the next two terms with the change of the composition of the Assembly making the 
PDK a strong opposition to the governing LDK and experiences of the first term, 
Kosovo government has matured more.  
Overall, the domestic institutions showed clear improvements in terms of 
adaptability over time. They were too young to talk about the indicator of age, 
nevertheless in terms of successful succession of leaders and the functionality it was 
clear that there were set on the path of maturity and they needed support, time, and 
experience on that path. Their improvements in the level of adaptability is clearly 
linked to the continuous support of the UN. Under the pillarized mission, the OSCE 
conducted the elections and monitored, therefore, succession of leaders was in line 
with democracy. The OSCE also monitored the Assembly and gave them 
recommendations so that everything would be in accordance with the laws. UNMIK 
closely observed every decisions of the government and provided technical support 
when necessary. The growing level of adaptability is a sign of UN’s success in 
statebuilding.  
4.2.2. Institutional Complexity 
Huntington argues the more complex structures institutions have the more they 
are institutionalized. He means by the complexity within institutions that having more 
subunits, in other words being more departmentalized, will bring stability through 
division of labor and will reduce the risks of corruption through checks and balances 
among departments. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the Kosovo Transitional Council 
(KTC) was a political forum where the seeds of administrative political institutions 
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have begun to grow. The first departmentalization in Kosovo political institutions 
appeared with the JIAS. The JIAS included the KTC with expanded number of 
members, an Interim Administrative Council, and administrative departments. The 
administrative departments were as follows in the Table 4.1, below, before they were 
amended in the PISG’s structures.  
 
Table 4.1. JIAS Administrative Departments (Brand, 2003: 23) 
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There were 20 administrative departments in the JIAS and political institutions 
emerged as the Presidency, the Assembly, the Government, and courts. As “the highest 
representative and legislative Provisional Institution of Self-Government of Kosovo” 
the Assembly is given more attention in this section of complexity. The Assembly had 
a Presidency composing of seven Assembly members. It also had main and functional 
committees “to review draft laws and make recommendations as appropriate”. The 
main committees were the Budget Committee and the Committee on Rights and 
Interests of Communities. The functional committees would be established by the 
Assembly when necessary. In its first term the Assembly created 19 committees and 
the number decreased to 13 in the second term with the fusion of duties in small 
number of committees as shown on the Table 4.2 below. According to the regular 
OSCE reports on monitoring the work of Kosovo Assembly, the committees met 
regularly and the participation of members increased when the numbers of committees 
were reduced. In 2007, some committees also established sub-committees (European 
Commission Kosovo Progress Report, 2007: 7).  
 
Table 4.2. Committees of the Assembly of Kosovo (Adopted from Rexhepi, 2012: 
181-182; OSCE, 2009) 
Committees in the First Legislative 
Term 
Committees in the Second Legislative 
Term 
Budget Budget and Finance 
Rights and Interests of Communities 
and Return 
Rights and Interests of Communities 
and Return 
Finance and Economy 
Judicial, Legislative and Constitutional 
Framework Matters, Gender Equality, 
Petitions and Public Claims 
Trade and Industry European Integration 
Education, Science and Technology 
Education, Science and Technology, 
Culture, Youth and Sports 
Culture, Youth and Sports 
Economy, Trade, Industry, Energy, 
Transport and Telecommunication 
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Table 4.2. Committees of the Assembly of Kosovo (continued) 
Health 
Agriculture, Forestry, Rural 
Development, Environment, and Spatial 
Planning 
Environment and Spatial Planning Health, Labor, and Social Welfare 
Labor and Social Welfare 
Public Services, Local Administration 
and Media  
Transport and Communications 
Mandates, Immunities and Rules of 
Procedure 
Public Services Internal Affairs and Security 
Agriculture, Forestry, Rural 
Development 
Human Rights, Gender 
Equality, Missing Persons and Public 
Petitions 
International Cooperation Foreign Affairs   
Emergency Preparedness  
Judicial, Legislative and Constitutional 
Framework 
 
Public Petitions  
Missing Persons  
Gender Equality  
Media  
 
The government of Kosovo in its first term had the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, the Minister of Culture, 
Youth, Sports and Non-Residents’ Affairs, the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Public Services, 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, the Ministry of Environment and Spatial 
Planning, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, and Forestry and Rural 
Development (UNMIK Regulation 2002/5). The number of ministries was enlarged to 
13 with the addition the Ministry of Energy and Mining, the Ministry of Returns and 
Communities, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Interior by 2006 
(UNMIK/PR/1469, 20 December 2005; UNMIK Regulation 2005/53; UNMIK 
Regulation 2006/26). This extension of ministries is related to the transfer of power 
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discussed in the institutional autonomy section. By looking the development of more 
units within the new Kosovo institutions, a positive trend is observable in terms of the 
complexity. As in the case of adaptability, UNMIK’s role in this positive trend is 
remarkable because new units were established via more autonomy given to the new 
institutions based on their development.  
4.2.3. Institutional Autonomy 
Huntington defines autonomy as “the extent to which political organizations 
and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of 
behavior” (1968:20, emphasis added). Kosovo is a case of international administration, 
therefore, in this study institutional autonomy refers to two things. The first one is the 
extent to which internal actors took part in institution building process and the second 
one is the extent to which political institutions have become independent from the 
international administration during the presence of the international administration. 
The autonomy of Kosovo’s political institutions will be analyzed through their degree 
of independence from UNMIK until its unilateral declaration of independence when 
UNMIK became a passive formality in 2008. The following questions shed light on 
this section of this study: How did Kosovars involve in institution building process 
and has the PISG become more independent in time during UNMIK’s active presence? 
The involvement of local actors is analyzed in the initial set-up process of political 
institutions and the institutional independence is possible to investigate through the 
process of official transfer of authority from UNMIK to the PISG. UNMIK aimed to 
transfer its powers to the PISG in line with the capacity development of the PISG’s 
institutions, which is in line with the argument of this study. During the transfer of 
authority, the capacities of related institutions are also analyzed to see if they gradually 
matured to hold more power and function them successfully. Therefore, in this chapter 
the ability of local institutions in performing their respected duties is also analyzed. At 
the start of institution building, autonomy was largely absent because domestic 
institutions were dependent on the international administration. The newly established 
institutions also lacked of technical as well as practical knowledge. With the support 
of the OSCE, their capacity increased over time and as well as their autonomy with 
gradual transfer of power. In 2008, the UNSC did not discharge UNMIK but 
significantly reduced its power. Although UNMIK was still present in 2008, Kosovo 
adopted a new constitution and declared independence, which indicate a good level of 
autonomy. 
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4.2.3.1. Local Ownership in Institution Building Process 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, during the initial process of institution 
building UNMIK tried to include local actors in the process. However, the first step 
on the way of creating a self-government, the formation of the KTC, happened without 
an election. Therefore, public at large was not included in the process. In such a post-
war situation, UNMIK prioritized security in Kosovo and in order to implement its 
mandate, it looked for the way of establishing authority in overall Kosovo through 
eliminating pre-war parallel structures. After the establishment of the Joint Interim 
Administrative Structures (JIAS), the leaders of parallel structures accepted to dissolve 
their administrations. The JIAS was also formed before a general election was held 
and the pre-war parties were given seats based on the electoral strength. After nine 
months, Kosovars were able to vote for the first Municipal elections and results proved 
the assumption of UNMIK in giving seats to political leaders in the JIAS.    
The Provisional Constitutional Framework was a joint effort of locals and 
internationals based on their merit on this issue. But UNMIK power was certain in the 
UNSC Resolution 1244 where the UN Special Representative was given the final say 
to accept or refuse the draft prepared. However, the UN Special Representative was 
using his power ex ante, hence, he did not reject the final draft. As the legal document 
was ready to establish the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, the first general 
elections was run. Kosovars chose their representatives and were integrated to the 
decision making process. After some disputes in forming the government as mentioned 
in Chapter Three, the Assembly, the Presidency, and the Government began to 
function. What kind of authorities were given to the PISG over 7 years under 
UNMIK’s auspices? Did the PISG become autonomous of UNMIK in the process? 
4.2.3.2. The Transfer of Authority to the PISG 
UNMIK announced its decisions as “Regulations” and “Administrative 
Directions”. Regulations were defined as “legislative acts” and the regulations 
remained “in force until repealed by UNMIK or superseded by such rules as are 
subsequently issued by the institutions established under a political settlement, as 
provided for in United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)”. 
Administrative directions were the implementations of regulations but not all 
regulations needed administrative directions.  
UNMIK issued 418 regulations and 206 administrative directions from 25 July 
1999 to 17 February 2008 with an overall decreasing trend as shown in the Table 4.3 
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below. However, the institutional independency cannot be analyzed by this decrease 
in the number of regulations and administrative directions because even if the PISG 
was given the right to legislate laws by the Constitutional Framework, the UN Special 
Representative promulgated every law made by the PISG. Therefore, regulations and 
administrative directions also include the laws made by the PISG. The institutional 
independence will be analyzed through the process of transfer of authority. 
 
Table 4.3. UNMIK Administrative Directions and Regulations 
 
The first transfer of authority can be dated back to August 1999 to the formation 
of the Joint Advisory Council on Legislative Matters. UNMIK aimed to include local 
experts in the process of drafting UNMIK regulations (Reka, 2003:154). The problem 
was that since 1989 the local courts were filled by Serbians when the autonomous 
status of Kosovo was dissolved, and these Serbians also fled the country after NATO 
bombings. Hence, legal experts in Albanian community were largely jobless for 10 
years and their voice in the Joint Advisory Council on Legislative Matters was not 
always heard (Reka, 2003:154).  
The transfer of authority officially started after the Constitutional Framework 
came into force in 2001. According to the framework following fields with an 
emphasis to the gradual increase in the authorities transferred to the PISG: 
a) Supporting inter-municipal cooperation; b) Promoting the development of a 
professional municipal civil service; c) Assisting the municipalities in the 
development of their own budgets and financial management systems; d) 
Year 
Number of Administrative Directions and 
Regulations 
1999 31 
2000 98 
2001 67 
2002 50 
2003 73 
2004 87 
2005 79 
2006 79 
2007 49 
2008 11 
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Monitoring the quality of municipal services; e) Identifying ways and means 
for training activities for the municipalities; f) Assisting the municipalities in 
making their activities transparent to the public; g) Providing legal guidance 
and advice to the municipalities; h) Coordinating the activities of international 
agencies and non-governmental organizations pertaining to municipalities; and 
i) Overseeing compliance with responsibilities and powers delegated to 
municipalities based on the organizational structures that emerged from the 
municipal elections in October 2000, as well as responsibilities and powers 
transferred in the meantime. It is understood that additional powers will be 
progressively transferred in an orderly manner” (UNMIK Regulation No. 
2001/9 part 5.2, [emphasis added]). 
The powers related to the statehood such as foreign affairs, justice, and security 
sectors largely remained under the control of UNMIK. Further transfer of authority 
would be in line with the progress made by the PISG. In this context, the efforts of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is important to mention 
since it has played a remarkable role in capacity building that promoted more 
competencies to the local institutions as well as more steps the path of sustainable 
domestic institutions. The UN through “pillarization” this time in Kosovo did not only 
create the institutions and left them their own but it observed their development 
process.  
4.2.3.2.1. OSCE: Capacity building on the way of self-sustaining 
institutions  
Under the UN umbrella, the OSCE and UNMIK have carried out joint work in 
institution building. Whereas UNMIK initiated the institution building process, the 
OSCE continuously supported established institutions in order to make them self-
sustainable (F. Mulolli, personal communication, August 5, 2015). The OSCE was 
mandated with: “(1) Human resources capacity-building, including the training of a 
new Kosovo police service within a Kosovo Police School which it will establish and 
operate, the training of judicial personnel and the training of civil administrators at 
various levels, in cooperation, inter alia, with the Council of Europe; (2) 
Democratization and governance, including the development of a civil society, non-
governmental organizations, political parties and local media; (3) Organization and 
supervision of elections; (4) Monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights, 
including, inter alia, the establishment of an Ombudsman institution, in co-operation, 
inter alia, with the UNHCHR […]” (Permanent Council Decision 305, 1999: 1-2). 
To that extent, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) organized general and 
municipal elections, established the Central Election Commission and the Kosovo 
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Police School. After the general elections OMIK launched its Assembly Support 
Initiative (ASI) as a forum for the Assembly members to improve their professional 
skills. ASI provided conferences and training sessions in Kosovo and abroad for the 
public servants. Some other important domestic institutions created through the 
assistance of OMIK include: the Ombudsperson Institution, the Kosovo Judicial 
Institute, the Criminal Defense Resource Centre, Radio Television Kosovo, the 
Temporary Media Commissioner, the Kosovo Media Institute, the Kosovo Police 
Service School, and the Police Inspectorate. The OSCE organized and monitored the 
municipal and general elections in Kosovo and trained the Central Election 
Commission to run elections independently.20 The OSCE took flexible initiatives when 
necessary to tackle with institutional problems. It observed all plenary sessions of the 
Assembly and gave them feedback on their deficiencies and successes and help for 
further improvements.  
The interagency cooperation in Kosovo under the UN auspices in institution 
building is a positive contribution to the autonomy level of Kosovo institutions since 
while establishing domestic institutions from zero point, the OSCE conducted its 
capacity building project so that when the international organizations left them alone 
they would get back on their feet. The UN through the resolution 1244 “pillarized” the 
Kosovo peacebuilding mission and UNMIK and OMIK shared the responsibilities for 
more successful outcomes.  
4.2.3.4. Further competences with the Eide Report and the Ahtisaari Plan     
After the Assembly elections in 2001, UNMIK set up a Transfer Council to 
foresee healthy transfer of power process. 19 of non-reserved powers listed in the 
Constitutional Framework were transferred and 17 of them put on the agenda to be 
transferred soon and UNMIK aimed to complete the transfer process by the end of 
2003 (Report of the Secretary General, S/2003/996). Apart from the non-reserved 
powers, Provisional Institutions demanded the transfer of reserved powers by UNMIK. 
The reserved powers were mostly about statehood ranging from the dissolving the 
assembly and calling for new elections to the final say on budget policy and 
administrating external affairs. Transferring these kind of powers would necessitate to 
take a decision on the final status of Kosovo. In line with Provisional Institutions’ 
                                                          
20 The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (2002) retrieved from: 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/37661?download=true 
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demand, UNMIK adopted “standards before status” formula which composed of 8 
benchmarks. The then SRSG Michael Steiner announced the benchmarks as: 
- Existence of effective, representative and functioning institutions; 
- Enforcement of the rule of law; 
- Freedom of movement; 
- Respect for the right of all Kosovans to remain and return; 
- Development of a sound basis for a market economy; 
- Clarity of property title; 
- Normalized dialogue with Belgrade; and 
- Reduction and transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps in line with its 
mandate (UNMIK/PR/719, 24 April 2002: 3-4). 
The benchmarks were set to make Kosovo institutions sustainable even after 
the international institutions departure as stated by the SRSG Steiner in the same 
addressing to the UNSC: “Kosovo can only advance towards a fair and just society 
when these minimum preconditions are met. And when the changes in institutions are 
sustainable even without an international presence.” (UNMIK/PR/719, 24 April 2002: 
4).  
In March 2004 some violent events occurred that led to the appointment of a 
UN special envoy to Kosovo. In March 2004, a Serbian at the age of 18 was killed by 
the drive-by shooting. News quickly spread that the Albanian community committed 
the crime. The next day of shooting, three Albanian children drowned in the Ibar River 
and one child survived. The mass media argued they were chased into the river by 
Serbs to take revenge of the young boy. In the subsequent days, 50,000 – 60,000 people 
participated in massive demonstrations, which later became violent. (OSCE, 2004). 
UNMIK reported these violent events as follows: “A total of 19 persons died in the 
violence, of whom 11 were Kosovo Albanians and 8 were Kosovo Serbs, and 954 
persons were injured in the course of the clashes … 65 international police officers, 58 
Kosovo Police Service (KPS) officers, and 61 personnel of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
suffered injuries. Approximately 730 houses belonging to minorities, mostly Kosovo 
Serbs, were damaged or destroyed … 36 Orthodox churches, monasteries and other 
religious and cultural sites were damaged or destroyed … sporadic attacks, including 
attacks against the international security and police presence, continued to occur … a 
Ghanaian UNMIK police officer and a Kosovo Albanian KPS officer were killed when 
a group of Kosovo Albanians fired on their UNMIK police patrol vehicle” (Report No. 
348, 2004: 1-2). 
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After the violent events Kai Eide was appointed as special envoy of the UN to 
issue a report about the situation on the ground. Finding the time suitable to expand 
further the competencies and responsibilities of the PISG, he wrote on his report: “An 
ambitious policy of transferring further competencies should be launched without 
delay, giving the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government a greater sense of 
ownership and responsibility as well as accountability. This should include 
establishing new ministries of energy, of justice and of community matters, human 
rights and returns” (Report of the Secretary General, S/2004/932: 6). Although he 
supported the expansion of power on the hand of the PISG, he nevertheless decreased 
the checks and balances power of UNMIK. He also pointed out in his report: “Further 
transfer of authority should be accompanied by greater readiness to use sanctions and 
interventions in order to set aside decisions, overrule policies and remove personnel. 
An inventory of possible measures of intervention and sanctions, including financial 
sanctions, nullifying decisions, overruling policies and removing personnel, should 
urgently be drawn up to guide the new Special Representative of the Secretary-
General” (Report of the Secretary General, S/2004/932: 17-18). After the report, the 
Ministry of Energy and Mining, the Ministry of Returns and Communities, the 
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior were established in 2004, 2005, and 2006 
respectively (UNMIK/PR/1469, 20 December 2005; UNMIK Regulation 2005/53; 
UNMIK Regulation 2006/26).  
Meanwhile UNMIK started to close down its pillars that signed large scale 
transfer of authority to the local institutions. As mentioned in Chapter Three after the 
great number of refugees returned pillar one was already closed down in June 2000 
and later it was given the responsibility of the rule of law functions in May 2001. Pillar 
1 and 2 were closed down in 2006 and pillar 4 in 2008 (UNMIK/PR/1606, 15 
November 2006; UNMIK Fact Sheet June 2008). The phasing out of Pillar 2, the UN 
Interim Administration, is important to mention as it is related to the overall autonomy 
of Kosovo institutions. UNMIK’s presence continued under much smaller Department 
of Civil Administration after 2006 as stated by UNMIK itself in 2006: “Over the seven 
years since, as Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) were 
established and gained capacity to assume more responsibilities, UNMIK has moved 
back from an executive role to one of monitoring and support to local institutions” 
(UNMIK/PR/1606, 15 November 2006). UNMIK’s staff also reduced to half 
comparing to early 2000s (Attachment to the UNMIK/PR/1606).  
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The UN’s special envoy Marti Ahtisaari presented his plan called the 
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement to the UN in 2007. 
According to the Comprehensive Proposal, Kosovo would adopt a constitution and 
govern itself democratically.21 UNMIK would transfer all legislative and executive 
powers to the government of Kosovo, the EU rule of law mission (EULEX) would be 
established, and the International Civilian Representative would monitor the process 
of implementation. The Assembly of Kosovo accepted the draft, while Serbia rejected. 
A “troika” of representatives from the EU, the US, and Russia was established with 
the initiative of the Contact Group and supported by the UN. The troika was to hold 
meetings with Prishtina and Belgrade over the future status of Kosovo, but a 
compromise was not reached due to the divergent positions of two sides (Report of the 
Secretary General, S/2007/723). Nevertheless, the Assembly of Kosovo formed a 
Constitutional Commission advised by the Ahtisaari Plan in early 2007 and a draft was 
ready by the end of 2007. After Kosovo declared independence in February 2008, the 
Assembly made some amendments on the draft and completed the constitution in April 
2008.  Although Serbian delegations did not participate the drafting process and 
boycotted the Assembly after the declaration of independence, they returned after a 
month (EU Kosovo Progress Report 2008).  
By the transfer of power process Kosovo’s political institutions have become 
more independent of UNMIK. Starting with the Constitutional Framework in 2001, 
power transferred to local institutions accelerated in coming years with the gradual 
development of political institutions. The power transfer process went in line with the 
capacity of local institutions and their capacity also increased within 9 nine years of 
active UN presence. Through the support of the OSCE, the PISG’s members gained 
technical knowledge and kept checked on track about their institutional development. 
By 2008, while UNMIK was the authority on the paper of UNSC 1244 over Kosovo’s 
institutions, the PISG was able to write a constitution and adopt it. Overall, Kosovo’s 
institutions were on the path of being autonomous during the UN’s presence with 
gradual increase in the power transferred. Moreover, the UN did not transfer these 
                                                          
21 For the full text of the Comprehensive Proposal see: 
http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/Comprehensive%20Proposal%20.pdf [last 
visited 20.04.2016] 
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competences overnight. It was a coordinated process with the reports and initiatives of 
the OSCE.  
4.2.4. Institutional Coherence 
The last indicator of institutionalization level for Huntington is institutional 
coherence. He emphasizes discipline within institutions in the context of coherence. A 
disciplined institution would have substantial consensus on functional boundaries and 
rules of problem solving. He also links autonomy with coherence by stating that 
autonomy is a mean to be coherent since autonomy may help to create distinct styles 
and norms within institutions. Within the context of Kosovo, the provisional 
institutions experienced a lack of coordination and discipline in their first consecutive 
terms. Deficiencies in coordination and discipline in legislative and executive bodies 
in decision-making, law drafting, and implementing were noticeable.  
As Nazim Jashari, member of the Assembly of Kosovo, pointed out: “Often 
the priority of the reviewed and adopted draft-laws was not clear. This is because thus 
far there were no attempts to set priorities in certain significant areas, as is the case in 
other parliaments. In a nutshell, we have the feeling that the draft-laws are quite often 
initiated just so we can add to the numbers of approved draft-laws” (ASI Newsletter 
24, 2005: 8). There was not a clear agenda in the Assembly and there were many 
occasions of noncompliance with the existing regulations within the Assembly as 
reported by the Assembly Support Initiative (Report 10/2005; Report 09/2005). For 
example, in many occasions the agenda for plenary sessions were not approved by the 
Assembly which is in the rules of procedure, proposals submitted by the parties in the 
Assembly were not taken to the agenda within the deadline of three weeks, and some 
members used electronic cards of others in voting.22 Rexhepi (2012) concludes that 
primary reasons for such violations of the rules of procedure in the Assembly were: 
the frequency of change in the rules (the rules of procedure changed three times in two 
legislative terms); members had multiple jobs that they did not have much time and 
concentration on their assembly works; office spaces and administrative supports were 
lacking (202-206).  
Despite the shortcomings of the first terms, the Assembly began to function in 
a more disciplined way in the second legislative term. With the approval of a reform-
                                                          
22  The members had electronic identification cards to insert into his or her device in order to 
register him/herself as present in the hall and to vote. 
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draft in 2006, the Assembly included in its plan: (1) a calendar for plenary sessions 
and meetings of Assembly Presidency, parliamentary groups and committees, (2) a 
calendar of events, announcing the relevant issues that Assembly have to focus on and 
tackle for a period 2-3 months, (3) a plan of standards, which is the backbone of the 
reform, the plan consists of the following: a. Question time- 50-minutes- for each 
plenary sessions, where assembly members can pose questions and the ministers have 
to answer them; b. Regular interpellations of parliamentary groups; c. Technical 
support for committees; d. Improvement of organization and performance of the 
administration; e. Draft-budget initiated by Committee on Budget and Finance and 
adopted by the Assembly; f. Improvement of information system; g. Access to official 
documents by both media and general public; h. The list of issues that need to be 
discussed or items of Agenda and the status of laws; (4) Amendments in the Rules of 
Procedure of the Assembly, which will enable the enactment of the reform.      
The comment of the speaker of the Assembly of Kosovo summarizes well the 
situation in the PISG. He acknowledged the remaining deficiencies in the institutions 
but the reform-package he stated represents “a solid-base, the establishment of a 
structure that will enable further advancement of the results and successes of the 
Assembly” (ASI Newsletter 24, 2005:3). To that extent, the Assembly approved its 
first annual work program and the public information office was established in 2007. 
The same year a new rules of procedure for the government was adopted providing 
more bases for coordination and organization within the government. On the other 
hand, the PISG began to prioritize the status talks after the Ahtisaari plan, therefore, it 
slowed the pace of reformation (European Commission Kosovo Progress Report, 
2007). I cannot conclude that by 2008 the PISG was coherent in its institutions 
nevertheless it was on the track of being coherent as there were improvements from 
the initial steps to the next steps.  
4.3. The Scope of Support 
For Huntington successful institutions are the ones which have broad scope of 
support in the society. Scope means “the extent to which the political organizations 
and procedures encompass activity in the society” and the scope is broad if the rules 
of institutions are followed by a large segment of the population (1973: 12). The scope 
of support in Kosovo institutions can be analyzed by looking to the two levels of 
society: The elite and the population. Kosovo is a case of international government 
after an ethnic war, therefore, the scope of support is problematic. This is because in 
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the aftermath of civil wars different actors of the war seek to have their shares in the 
new establishment. In this section, the support of Kosovo’s political elite to the new 
institutions of Kosovo will be analyzed through their compliance with the regulations 
and directions of UNMIK. Was there any conflict between the UNMIK’s and political 
elites’ agenda? Did the elites agree on UNMIK’s projects for institutions of Kosovo? 
I examine the scope of support by the public about the political institutions of Kosovo 
through the polls of the UN Development Program (UNDP) on popular satisfaction 
with institutions and voter turnout in three general elections. 
4.3.1. Support level of political elites in Kosovo 
The statement on the UNSC Resolution 1244 mandating UNMIK with 
“facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking 
into account the Rambouillet accords” gave hope for independence to Albanian 
Kosovars. Therefore, international intervention was welcomed by the political elites 
of Albanian Kosovars as each step on the way of creating a self-government would 
bring them closer to independence. As mentioned in Chapter Three two different pre-
war parallel structures to the Serbian regime among the Albanian community existed 
in the aftermath of the war while UNMIK was setting up itself. Nevertheless, UNMIK 
achieved to unite them under the JIAS and Albanian Kosovars took active part in the 
initial setting process of the PISG as well. On the other hand, in 2004 the UN special 
envoy Kai Eide reported to the UNSC: “The international community in Kosovo is 
today seen by Kosovo Albanians as having gone from opening the way to now standing 
in the way” (S/2004/932: 11). What factors have brought Albanian Kosovars to this 
opposition level?  
Albanian Kosovars had the objective of an independent Kosovo on their agenda 
from the beginning as they fought for it in the late 1990s against the Serbian regime. 
UNMIK initiated the “standards before status benchmarks” in 2002 mentioned above 
in the autonomy section delayed their desire for independence. In the same report, Eide 
stated: “The current ‘standards before status’ policy lacks credibility. The 
implementation of a highly ambitious set of standards before status talks begins is seen 
as unachievable” (S/2004/932: 4). Although these standards helped domestic 
institutions to seek further development towards sustainable institutions, the problem 
was that these standards were set as a barrier to status talks. With a new composition 
of the parliament after the second general elections, political elite felt themselves more 
representing the people and therefore UNMIK should have transferred more power to 
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the real representatives. After the Eide report, UNMIK accelerated the power transfer 
process as discussed in the autonomy section above. Overall, Albanian Kosovars’ 
elites did not give up taking part in the institution building project and never perceived 
the PISG illegitimate.  
In contrast to the support of Albanian Kosovars, the Serbian Kosovar elites 
opposed the provisional institutions from time to time. They accepted to send a 
representative to the KTC but they withdrew later due to a violent event against 
Serbian Kosovars. They also did not accept to participate in the Joint Working Group 
for drafting a constitution at the beginning but later they participated (UNMIK/PR/529 
& 559). Their support for the institutions was related to the policy of the Republic of 
Serbia as well. In time of more moderate leader, Zoran Djindjic, in Serbia Serbian 
elites in Kosovo cooperated more with UNMIK and their support level increased 
(Narten, 2008). After the first general elections the Serbian Coalition Return Party 
(SC) had 10 reserved seats and plus 12 seats in the Assembly. The SC deputies 
sometimes boycotted the Assembly over disagreements but they accepted to be present 
with the OSCE monitoring of the plenary sessions. (ASI Newsletter 5, 2003). The SC 
continued as two different Serbian parties after 2005 and in some occasions one of 
them was present in the Assembly while the other boycotted due to their different 
policies. After the 2007 elections, only two Serbian parties out of six took the oath and 
no single Serbian deputy was present in the Assembly for the meeting of independence 
in 2008 (Report of the Secretary General, S/2008/354). Apart from the central level, 
Serbia supported parallel structures existed at the municipal level, especially in the 
northern Kosovo. Four municipalities, Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, Zveçan, and Northern 
Mitrovica, had their own security structures, schools, and healthcare systems funded 
by Serbia (OSCE, 2008).  If the condition for institutionalization in terms of the elite 
support is based on the large segment of the elite population, we can conclude 
Kosovo’s institutions were supported by the majority of the elite in Kosovo since 
Serbian political elites compose a minority.  
4.3.2. Support level of public in Kosovo 
Support of public for Kosovo institutions can be analyzed through their 
satisfaction level with the institutions and voter turnout. After the establishment of the 
PISG the support for Kosovo institutions had an increasing trend until June 2005 as 
shown in the chart of public satisfaction below. 
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Figure 4.1. Public Satisfaction 2002-2008 (UNDP Early Warning Report Kosovo 
Report #1 to #19) 
 
In the initial process of institution building public at large were satisfied with 
the performance of domestic institutions. This increasing trend began to decline 
towards the end of 2005 and satisfaction level was lowest on December 2006. It 
slightly rose up in 2007 and after the declaration of independence almost half of the 
respondents were “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the government and the 
Assembly. There are various factors of the declining trend. With the transfer of more 
power and the start of status talks people started to perceive domestic institutions as 
responsible from the overall bad economic situation and the corruption level. It was 
the UNMIK which was blamed by people in the initial process about political and 
economic situations on the ground (UNDP Early Warning Report #15: 15). 
Dissatisfaction with the economic situation was at the highest level in times of decline 
on the satisfaction level. The start of status talks and a possibility of decentralization 
by ethnic lines coincided with the time of decline in the satisfaction level. UNDP 
concluded the dissatisfaction on the status talks “due to the fact that K-Serbs and K-
Albanians have diametrically opposing preferences for status and any attempt at 
compromise has so far resulted in dissatisfaction” (UNDP Early Warning Report #15: 
17).  
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The second indicator of institutional support at the mass level is the voter 
turnout. As the chart of voter turnout for three Assembly elections in 2001, 2004, and 
2007 show there is a continuous decline. One of the reason for that is the increase in 
the number of registered eligible voters and another reason is related to the Serbian 
Kosovars’ participation. In the first Assembly elections, UNMIK convinced the 
Serbian community to vote in exchange of decentralization in which they would 
govern themselves. Serbian Kosovars did not cast their vote in the second and third 
Assembly elections due to the boycott call of the Serbian government (S/2007/768: 2). 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Assembly Elections 2001-2007 
 
With the percentage of Serbs (6% according to the UNDP report) in Kosovo 
taken into consideration, Huntington’s criteria for institutional support at mass level 
can be seen lacking in the majority of population due to the lower voter turnout. The 
lower voter turnout was parallel with the overall satisfaction of people in Kosovo. Prior 
to the election the SRSG noted: “People were generally disappointed with their 
political leaders and this erosion of the credibility and trust would be reflected by a 
possible lower turnout” (EP Election Observation Mission, 2007: 6-7). Poor level of 
economic growth and the wellbeing of people, and ambiguity on the future status were 
the main reasons of Albanian Kosovars’ abstention from voting. 
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4.4. Conclusion 
The UN was not successful to prevent and then stop the war in Kosovo. It was 
NATO who made the ground ready for the UN involvement after its failures in conflict 
prevention. As this study argues the UN has more success in the aftermath of civil wars 
thanks to its various channels. Its channels enable the UN to cooperate with different 
international, regional and domestic organizations for a better peacebuilding missions. 
Its composite structure assures its credibility and legitimacy on the eyes of both 
political elites and the public at large as in the case of Kosovo.   
In this chapter I analyzed the efforts of the UN in institution building of 
Kosovo. This study argues the UN can set the path for new state institutions and 
support them until they become self-sustainable. The path dependent nature of state 
institutions will carry the rest and once established the institutions will take steps on 
that path. An in-depth research in the case of Kosovo shows the UN constructed the 
path for new Kosovo institutions and these institutions continued on that path with 
gradual improvements. Alongside with Huntington’s criteria for successful institutions 
I analyzed new Kosovo institutions. Despite the fact the institutions were young to 
analyze, I aimed to observe their level of improvements. In other words, the objective 
was to examine whether the institutions were on the track of being autonomous, 
coherent, complex and adaptable on the path of institutionalization. According to the 
findings of this study, Kosovo institutions were put on the path of institutionalization 
through technical as well as material support of UNMIK within a pillar structure. The 
UN kept its eye on the institutions after they began to have authority over their own 
governance. The capacity building projects of the OSCE and the involvement of 
experienced legal experts in constitution building, in legislature and executive 
processes helped Kosovars to accumulate experience and to obtain know-how skills 
and implement in the next consecutive terms. Overall improvements in these 
institutions under the mentioned criteria is observable. The UN succeeded in 
establishing what a state would need to have in Kosovo by 2008. 
On the other hand, there was a negative trend in the level of public support to 
Kosovo institutions. In the beginning of the mission, UNMIK was welcomed by the 
public as well. However, their expectations were mostly independence and economic 
well-being. A possible autonomy to the Serbian municipalities dissatisfied Albanian 
Kosovars but it was necessary for UNMIK to include Serbian Kosovars to the 
statebuilding process for more sustainable results. After the war, the economic 
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recovery took time and people remained poor under the new institutions. People 
considered UNMIK responsible of the poor economic level in the first years of the 
mission, therefore, the PISG was largely absent from the blame. The PISG was on the 
target in its second and third terms of office as it took majority of control from 
UNMIK. Parallel to the transfer of authority the future status talks started that made 
the PISG more representative of Kosovo, therefore, the problems of Kosovo.  
In terms of peace assessment based on the Galtung conflict and peace triangle, 
there was no occurrence of large-scale violence over the years of the UN’s existence. 
The March 2004 events were concerning violent events but nothing turned out to be 
an ethnic war again in Kosovo. Hence, the UN mission in Kosovo prevented direct 
violence, which involves violent behaviors, according to Galtung’s definition. 
However, the main incapability/contradiction that caused the breakup of war in 1998, 
the status of Kosovo, was yet to be solved through different negotiation mechanisms. 
By 2007 with the troika group and later on the EU initiated talks between Prishtina 
and Serbia were on the scene. Prishtina and Serbia did not reach an agreement therefore 
the UN did not solve the structural violence. Nevertheless, the process was set and 
formal talks continued. Peace process is a continuing one and a conclusion is hard to 
achieve in this case in terms of structural and cultural violence. As the project 
managers of an NGO dealing with reconciliation between Serbs and Albanians, the 
Community Building Mitrovica, rightly put it: “Achieving cultural peace may take 
ages” (M. Raičević, Personal Communication, August 4, 2015). But for the scope of 
analysis of this study, direct violence between Albanian Kosovars and the Republic of 
Serbia never broke out again. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The mere fact of the increased number of civil wars in post-Cold War era has 
put conflict resolution on the agenda of states, international organizations, NGOs and 
regional organizations. The new wars were within states and their solution was not 
possible through maintaining ceasefire, monitoring peace, and establishing buffer 
zones, since renewal of violence was most likely in intra-state wars. These conflicts 
have different dimensions to tackle with such as cultural, economic, and political and 
the UN is the most anticipated actor in the endeavor of peace.  
The UN has an evolving performance in the conflict resolution field. It has 
moved from mere observance of signed negotiations in inter-state conflicts to more 
complex peacebuilding missions in intra-state conflicts in the aftermath of the Cold 
War. Nevertheless, its success level is not homogenous in the different layers of 
conflict resolution. The UN fails in conflict prevention due to the lack of a special 
secretariat to institutionalize the process of conflict prevention and the perception of 
developing states on conflict prevention measures as great power interference. As the 
UN often fails to prevent a conflict to become war, the next phase is peacemaking or 
war stopping. The UN does not also have a positive record on peacemaking due to its 
inability to stop intra-state armed conflicts in a short time period where civilians suffer 
the most and fast reaction is crucial like in the cases of Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, 
Haiti, East Timor, and Kosovo throughout the 1990s. As this study argues the UN’s 
ineffectiveness in peacemaking is related to its decision making mechanism. The UN 
takes measures in terms of protecting universal peace and security through the Security 
Council. The UNSC needs unanimous votes of five permanent members with too 
diverse interests and aspirations. In the Cold War years, for example, it was either the 
U.S or the Soviet Union vetoing necessary actions due to their opposing interests and 
aims. Even after the Cold War period, permanent members reacted to conflict cases 
based on their interests. For instances in the Balkans, Russia kept vetoing any military 
measures against Serbia due to their historical alliance and Russia’s regional interests. 
It was NATO, faster and smaller than the UN, that stopped these wars.  
Despite its negative score on the UN’s success level in conflict prevention and 
peacemaking, this study states that the UN currently performs better and has even 
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greater potential to achieve its goals in the aftermath of civil wars, especially in 
statebuilding steps. The UN has advantages in its statebuilding missions in terms of its 
technical and monetary resources. It has channels of cooperation with different NGOs 
and regional organizations to create sustainable institutions. I supported the strong 
impact of institutions in the occurrence of war or in the termination of war. If the UN 
is willing to achieve sustainable peace, it needs to help reconstructing destroyed 
structures or constructing the new ones. However, the help is not limited to guiding 
locals for a constitution, then observing elections, and exit from the war shattered 
place. Rather the help is about taking the first steps and continuously promoting 
established institutions until they become mature. Taking from the historical 
institutionalist school, I used the path dependency assumption in my argument. 
Accordingly, if the UN seeds the roots of state institutions in cooperation with local 
actors and supports their capacity, they would continue on their path with more steps 
taken on the same path. Therefore, path deviation will be difficult.  
Using Kosovo as my case study, I stated the UN was unable to prevent the 
Kosovo War or to stop it. It was NATO’s peacemaking mission that stopped the war 
and prepared the ground for peacebuilding. Military measures are not enough alone to 
bring sustainable peace to a post-conflict country. There needs to be a strong backup 
missions to deal with the devastating effects of war to physical and political 
infrastructure. Since the UN could not pass a resolution for military measures during 
the war, it began to function in Kosovo after NATO’s bombing in military operation 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo War in 1999. Despite 
the fact UN’s efforts for peacemaking was a failure in Kosovo, it is not a hopeless 
story for the UN to seek peace in the peacebuilding process. The UN with its pillar 
structure established UNMIK in Kosovo and divided labor of peacebuilding among 
other organizations based on their specialized field. The UN has more success potential 
in peacebuilding, especially in statebuilding, thanks to its large umbrella of resources.  
My analysis on the UN’s institution building measures in Kosovo from 1999 
to 2008 shows the UN has set the path for further development and success in Kosovo 
institutions.  I examined the initial steps taken by the UN in its endeavor of creating 
self-government institutions in Kosovo to observe the change in the trend of 
established institutions. Kosovo’s institutions are young and this limits my research to 
have a conclusion on their being successful or not. However, I used Huntington’s two 
criteria in institutional success and this research is about the process not about the 
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conclusion. With an in-depth analysis, I started to examine Kosovo’s institutions from 
the beginning and observed their path to progression or regression. 
When I adopted two main indicators of successful institutions; the level of 
institutionalization and the scope of support, I found overall positive development in 
terms of the level of institutionalization but a negative progress in the mass level 
support for institutions. In terms of adaptability, Kosovo institutions are not old enough 
to check the age indicator because they were born in 1999. However, successful 
succession of leaders in the Presidency, the Assembly, and the Government occurred 
in Kosovo. There were five successful elections monitored by the OSCE and changes 
in leaderships happened in a democratic way. In times of urgent changes in leadership, 
like the one occurred when Haradinaj resigned from the Prime Ministry due to his 
indictment in the ICTY, the Assembly worked smoothly and chose a new one in a 
short span of time. Moreover, the institutions showed improvements in their 
functionality over time. In the first years, there were many deficiencies in the 
institutions due to lack of structural things like government buildings and lack of 
experience that reduced the level of functionality. The legislative and executive 
branches were uncoordinated with each other and it took long to implement drafted 
laws. The accumulation of experience and support from the international actors 
overcame many problems in the second terms of office in the institutions. The 
functionality graph was an increasing one over time.  
I illustrated the second criteria, complexity, in Kosovo institutions by looking 
existing sub-departments and committees and also changes in the numbers of 
departments and committees over time. Parallel to the transfer of power more 
competencies required more ministries and more committees in the Assembly. There 
is no exact number of how many sub-units necessary to call an institution complex but 
overall trend in terms of departmentalization was also growing one in Kosovo.  
The criteria of autonomy were rather problematic in Kosovo institutions. The 
final status was not certain yet and UNMIK had the last say in the legislative and 
executive branches. I estimated the autonomy level of institutions through the transfer 
of power process in which UNMIK gradually transferred its full control to the local 
institutions. There were two main questions in terms of autonomy in this research. One 
was about the inclusion of local actors in institution building, even if UNMIK 
controlled the institutions in the initial phase. In such a post-war situation where 
different pre-war parties sought to get the control of new environment, I argued 
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UNMIK was successful to include local political elites in institution building process. 
UNMIK established different joint groups to consult its regulations and to create the 
draft of first constitutional framework. These groups included local experts as well as 
international experts. After their joint efforts, elections were taken and institutions 
were established. UNMIK gradually transferred competencies to these institutions. 
The main problem was the lack of decision on the status of Kosovo. UNSC 1244 
mandated UNMIK with creating self-government in Kosovo but whether this self-
government would be within an independent state or an autonomous state of Serbia 
was not decided yet. Therefore, UNMIK reserved powers related to statehood such as 
dissolving the Assembly and conducting external affairs. The OSCE as a pillar of 
UNMIK offered different capacity building projects to new institutions and parallel to 
their development UNMIK continued to transfer powers.  The number of powers 
transferred as well the speed of power transfer accelerated over years. Therefore, the 
independence level of institutions from UNMIK has increased. When Kosovo declared 
unilateral independence, it had all necessary institutions that a sovereign state must 
have. The UN constantly supported the formation of an entire state structure in 
Kosovo. On the other hand, Kosovo formally remained under UNMIK’s control even 
if it declared independence in 2008.  
When I analyzed new institutions from the perspective of the last indicator of 
institutionalization, which is coherence, I also found institutions took further steps on 
their path to be more coherent. Does an institution have a set of conduct, rules and 
norms for its vital responsibilities and problem solving mechanisms? It is a common 
problem in new institutions that establishing rules and norms take time. There occurred 
instances of incompliances with the rules of procedure in the Assembly and the 
Assembly did not set the agenda for Assembly sessions, which caused delays in 
drafting important laws. In the second legislative term, the Assembly increased its 
level of coherence as well.  
I applied the second criteria for successful institutions, the scope of support, to 
two levels of Kosovo society; the political elite and the public. The UN achieved 
legitimacy among the political elite and the public and the UN had a good level of 
support from both. When it comes to the new institutions, there is an overall decrease 
in the support level of public towards the institutions. The support level was moderate 
in the initial process and people considered UNMIK responsible in economics and 
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politics. With the transfer of power, the PISG has become responsible in bad economic 
conditions and unresolved status issue.   
To conclude, the UN is on a success track in statebuilding. It cooperated with 
locals and created the path for successful institutions and due to path dependent nature 
of political institutions the system has taken further steps on the same path in Kosovo. 
At the same time, the UN supported local institutions through capacity building 
initiatives, providing financial and physical infrastructure, and technicalities.  
5.1. Limitations of the Dissertation and Recommendations for Future 
Research 
This research is an in-depth case analysis. I analyzed my argument on the UN’s 
success potential in Kosovo based on my archival analysis, reports of international 
organizations, and my personal interviews. However, it is a single case study therefore 
it shares the general limitations of single case studies in social sciences. It is not 
possible to reach a generalization based on this study. This is also not a comparative 
case study, which also prevents reaching more findings about the topic. My field 
research was limited in terms of time and therefore the number of interviews. More 
interviews would enrich the data in this research.  
There are various levels of statebuilding, which can be coordinated by a greater 
number of national, international, and nongovernmental organizations. This study only 
looks to institution building measures taken by the UN and leaves the rest of the 
organizations untouched. I also did not cover the peace talks between Kosovo and 
Serbia and their effects on statebuilding process. The role of the UN in these peace 
talks is not deeply covered as well. Further research can and should examine the role 
of the agreement between conflicting parties on the statebuilding process.  
This study can and should be tested in a broader empirical spectrum including 
cases in and out of Europe, such as East Timor and Bosnia where the UN also 
conducted statebuilding missions. In terms of the temporal dimension, this study 
covers the time period of 1999-2008. In order to reach to more reliable conclusions, 
the time period should be extended. Hence, there should be more observations in a 
longer time period in Kosovo and in other cases. Future research can also utilize more 
data and more diverse method, both qualitative and quantitative, on the examination 
of institutions. 
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